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tion, such as the manipulation of reviews in online rating platforms, or the act of
misreporting one’s preferences in matching mechanisms; and how those manipula-
tions affect the overall allocation in the economy.
Chapter 1 analyses the incentives that drive some sellers to fake reviews in
online rating platforms, such as Amazon and Yelp. Among other things, I find
that sellers’ optimal investment in fake reviews is not a monotone function of their
reputation. More precisely, sellers that currently possess a very good or very bad
history of past reviews have less incentives to solicit fake reviews praising their own
products, the intuition being that, for sellers with very bad reputation, it is too
costly to pretend that they are high quality sellers; while sellers that have already
accumulated a very good reputation do not need to spend much effort in convincing
buyers that they are high quality sellers. Moreover, in order to maximize the impact
from each fake review, sellers tend to concentrate review manipulation at the initial
stages after they have entered the market.
Chapter 2 develops a theoretical model aimed at explaining the observed po-
larization on agents’ beliefs regarding topics that have objective truths (e.g., such
as whether or not global warming is a hoax). The main premises surrounding the
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Chapter 1: On Incentives to Manipulate Online Ratings
With the proliferation of online rating platforms, there has been an increasing
concern over the authenticity of reviews posted online. While much effort has been
dedicated to improving fake review detection algorithms, little attention has been
spent on understanding the incentives that drives some sellers to solicit fake reviews.
To fill this gap, this paper develops a theoretical model in which sellers dynamically
choose their effort spent on review manipulation. Among other things, the model
predicts that sellers’ optimal investment in fake reviews is not a monotone function
of their reputation. More precisely, sellers that currently possess a very good or
very bad history of past reviews have less incentives to solicit fake reviews praising
their own products, the intuition being that, for sellers with very bad reputation,
it is too costly to pretend that they are high quality sellers; while sellers that have
already accumulated a very good reputation do not need to spend much effort in
convincing buyers that they are high quality sellers. Another prediction from the
model is that, in order to maximize the impact from each fake review, sellers tend
to concentrate review manipulation at the initial stages after they have entered the
market. Using data collected from Amazon, I was able to observe those two features
from the model at the empirical level by estimating a Logit regression that predicts
1
the probability of a review being fake as a function of the product’s reputation and
the time it took for the review to be posted since the seller entered the market.
1.1 Introduction
With the proliferation of online rating platforms such as Yelp and TripAdvisor,
there has been an increasing concern over the authenticity of reviews posted online.
In the news one can find several pieces of anecdotal evidence that fake reviews are
prolific and have been increasing over the last years (see for instance Amazon’s Fake
Review Problem Is Now Worse Than Ever, Study Suggests (Forbes, Sep 9, 2017),
Facebook fake review factories uncovered by Which? investigation, (The Guardian,
Oct., 2018) and ‘The Shed at Dulwich’ was London’s top-rated restaurant. Just one
problem: It didn’t exist (Washington Post, Dec 8, 2017)).
Those practices can add distortions to the market through a series of channels,
a few of which include: 1) they can lead customers to make suboptimal decisions;1
2) they can also lead customers to perceive reviews as a poor measurement of the
product’s quality, and it is a well established result that, when buyers do not know
1Notice that in some markets a suboptimal decision made by customers can be quite costly,
such as in the market for private doctors, where the resulting assignment can impact patients’
health. And in those markets the surge of online platforms as the likes of vitals.com, ratemds.com,
Yelp, etc., which display reviews from physicians, has been increasingly playing a bigger role in
customers’ decisions. Shukla, Gao and Agarwal (2018), for instance, find that the introduction of
reviews in a doctor appointment platform in India has increased the number of online appointments
for highly rated doctors by roughly 29.6%, while decreasing the number of appointments from
unrated doctors.
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the quality of the products sold, adverse selection may occur (Akerlof (1970)); 3)
buying fake reviews can be unfair to sellers who refuse to engage in this practice for
ethical or legal concerns, etc. These problems have motivated the dissemination of a
literature in Computer Science dedicated to detecting and eliminating fake reviews
in online platforms (see section 1.2 for details).
In contrast to computer scientists, economists are usually more interested in
understanding the causal effects that lead some sellers to fake reviews more than
others. One motivation for understanding these causal effects is that such knowledge
can be used to perfect existing algorithms used in the detection process. Indeed,
by understanding what causes sellers to fake reviews, one can trim down the set of
predictors to be used in the detection algorithm to include only the most pertinent
variables.
This paper fits into the latter branch of the literature, as it aims to shed light
into the incentives that drive some sellers to fake reviews. For that purpose the pa-
per develops a novel theoretical framework in which sellers dynamically choose their
optimal amount of effort devoted to faking reviews in online rating platforms such
as Yelp, Amazon and TripAdvisor, given that faking reviews is costly to sellers and
that customers correctly anticipate some reviews may be fake. The model predicts
that, in order to maximize the impact from each fake review, high quality sellers
have incentives to concentrate review fraud at the initial stages after they have en-
tered the market. As their reputation improves over time, such sellers gradually
fake less reviews. For low quality sellers, however, maintaining a good reputation
is unsustainable in the long run, as they systematically receive reviews disparaging
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their products from honest consumers. Once their reputation has been squandered,
such sellers exit the market and reenter with a new brandname, always concen-
trating their efforts in review manipulation right after reentering the market, so as
to maximize the impact from each fake review. So in markets wherein changing
one’s name is relatively costless, low quality sellers should be expected to dispropor-
tionally fake more reviews than high quality sellers in the long run. Verifying this
last prediction empirically may be challenging, since the sellers that change their
brandnames usually do so in a concealed fashion that prevents the researcher from
accessing their previous identities.
Another qualitative prediction from the model is that the effort spent on review
fraud is not a monotone function of the seller’s reputation. More precisely, very low
or very high reputation levels are usually associated with a low effort on review
manipulation, the intuition being that, for sellers with very low reputation, it is too
costly to pretend that they are high quality types, which gives them little incentives
to fake reviews; similarly, for sellers with very good reputation, the marginal benefit
from faking reviews is relatively small since everyone already believes the seller to
be of high quality with high probability.
To test some of the predictions from the model, I scraped reviews from different
products sold by Amazon that I flagged as suspicious based on the fact that their
sellers were (apparently) soliciting fake reviews online (namely, through Facebook
and Rapidworkers). I then classified the reviews collected as fake and real based
on a series of criteria used in the computer science literature dedicated to detecting
fake reviews through supervised learning algorithms. After that I estimated a Logit
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model to predict the probability of a review being fake conditional on the seller’s
reputation, and on the time it took for the review to be posted since the seller
entered the market. Consistent with the predictions from the theoretical model, the
results from the regressions suggest that the probability of a review being fake is
lower for sellers with very high or very low reputation. Moreover, the probability
of a review being fake diminishes with time, which is consistent with the prediction
that sellers should focus review manipulation at the initial stages following their
entrance (or reentrance with a new brandname) into the market.
1.2 Related Literature
When it comes to related literature done on the theoretical level, one can cite
the work from Mayzlin (2006) and Dellarocas (2006). These papers have different
premises and predictions as to the types of sellers that have most incentives to fake
reviews.
Starting with Mayzlin’s paper, it assumes that consumers randomly observe
a single opinion and then, based on that single observation, update their beliefs
regarding the quality of sellers, knowing that the opinion that they picked might
potentially be fake. Her model leads to the prediction that low quality sellers fake
more reviews as compared to high quality sellers. However this conclusion relies
on the assumption that each buyer only observes a single review extracted from
the overall pool of reviews, when in reality most online rating platforms (e.g., Yelp,
TripAdvisor, Amazon, etc.) provide summary statistics of all previous reviews.
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Moreover the model implicitly assumes that consumers know exactly how many
legitimate reviews have been posted online, even though they do not know the total
number of reviews posted (i.e., the number of fake plus real reviews). In addition,
her model imposes a series of technical restrictions on exogenous parameters, such
as sellers’ initial reputation, which prevents one from performing some comparative
statics analysis, such as how reputation affects the effort on review manipulation.
Finally, her model transpires in a single time window, which prevents one from
accessing, for example, whether sellers have incentives to concentrate review fraud
at the initial stages after they have entered into the market, or smooth review
manipulation throughout the periods.
Dellarocas (2006), on the other hand, uses a different specification that ab-
stracts from some of the technical complications associated with modeling fake re-
view optimization. In particular, it assumes that legitimate reviews generate a
stochastic signal (common to all customers) that is correlated with the product’s
true quality. Because the signal is stochastic, if sellers invest in the distortion of
this signal through fake reviews, buyers can not perfectly separate which part of
the signal was generated by honest reviews, and which part was explained by fake
reviews added to the system.
Different than Mayzlin (2006), Dellarocas (2006) predicts that in some in-
stances high quality sellers may actually fake more reviews than low quality sellers.
But those results suffer from a few limitations, including: 1) The paper has a few
mistakes when it comes to the derivation of the seller’s profit function. 2) It uses
an intractable data generating process for product quality. Indeed, it assumes that
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the quality parameter is drawn from a normal distribution, which implies that the
seller’s strategy is a continuous function that maps its type into effort on review ma-
nipulation. This implies that the researcher has to rely on guess and verify methods
to discover the functional format of the equilibrium strategy. In Dellarocas (2006),
the equilibrium they analyze is one in which the seller’s optimal investment on fake
reviews is an affine function of its quality, which would then imply that a seller with
a sufficiently low quality (or sufficiently high quality, depending on whether this
affine function is increasing or decreasing) would choose to receive money to have
its products disparaged (i.e., they would choose a negative amount of fake reviews),
which is a strategy that might be hard to be implementable in practice. Not to
mention that the model could potentially have many other equilibria. 3) Finally,
like Mayzlin (2006), his model transpires in a single time window, thus preventing
researches from accessing whether sellers have incentives to concentrate review fraud
at the initial stages following their entrance into the market.
My theoretical framework is very similar to Dellarocas’ specification. The
main differences and innovations from my model are that: 1) it corrects some issues
regarding the derivation of the profit function from the seller; 2) it assumes that
there are only two types of quality, high and low, as opposed to a continuum set of
types, which makes the model more tractable, and therefore allows one to compute
relevant comparative statics; 3) it allows the seller to be forward looking and set its
effort on review manipulation dynamically, thus allowing the researcher to derive
conclusions regarding dynamic aspects of review manipulation.
A common feature share by these two papers which is also present in my
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own model is that they both have the desirable property that consumers correctly
anticipate that some reviews are fake. So when looking at signals generated by
reviews, consumers curb their expectations by taking into account that some reviews
are not perfectly reliable, which is consistent with anecdotal evidence that consumers
are aware of the existence of fake reviews.
As to empirical papers that investigate variables that affect review manipula-
tion, one can cite Luca and Zervas (2016) and Mayzlin, Dover and Chevalier (2014).
Among other things, these two papers find, using different databases, that chain
restaurants (in Luca and Zervas (2016)) and chain hotels (in Mayzlin, Dover and
Chevalier (2014)) are less likely to fake positive reviews praising their products,
since they offer a standard service that already has a solidified reputation.
Luca and Zervas (2016) also run regressions that seem to support their con-
jecture that sellers with lower reputation have more incentives to fake reviews, and
as their reputation improve, they gradually fake less reviews (hence, the creative
title from their paper: “fake it till you make it”). To test this conjecture, they use
positive reviews (4 or 5 stars) filtered by Yelp as a proxy to measure the effort of
review manipulation spent by restaurant owners, then regress the number of filtered
reviews per time interval as a function of the total number of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 stars
accumulated by the restaurant in previous periods. A limitation from this speci-
fication is that, by grouping the number of filtered reviews into time intervals the
researchers lose pertinent information regarding each individual review that could
be used to correct for classification errors (i.e., to correct for real reviews that were
wrongly filtered by Yelp, as well as fake reviews that Yelp failed to filter). Moreover,
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the number of reviews filtered by Yelp may not be a very good measure as to the
effort spent on review manipulation, since, according to Yelp’s website, they not
only filter reviews that have high chances of being fake, but also reviews that are
likely to be less relevant to consumers (say, because the reviews lack useful content,
or they are too old, etc.). Finally, even though the authors find that having more
previous 4 and 5 stars are usually associated with less fake reviews in the current
period, they haven’t actually created a univariate measure of reputation to test their
conjecture. One contribution from my paper is that it uses a different database that
targets the detection of fake reviews exclusively. Moreover I use a logit specification
that corrects for endogenous classification errors by using data at the individual
level. And finally, in order to measure the the impact that reputation has on the
incentives to fake reviews, I create a univariate measure of sellers’ reputation, as
opposed to using a vector of the number of previous 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 stars received.
There is another branch of the literature that focuses in analyzing the impact
that reviews have on sales. To cite a few papers, ?, ? and Shukla, Gao and Agarwal
(2018) find that positive reviews have a positive and significant impact on sales
(? use data from book reviews at Amazon and bn.com, while ? uses data from
restaurant reviews on Yelp, and Shukla, Gao and Agarwal (2018) use review data
from a doctor appointment platform in India). My paper, on the other hand, takes
those results as given, and focuses instead in identifying the types of sellers that
have most incentives to fake reviews.
This paper uses a combination of methodologies employed in the computer sci-
ence literature to create training databases for the purpose of fake review detection.
9
Essentially, to detect fake reviews through supervised machine learning techniques,
researchers need to feed the machine with some examples of reviews that they know
to be fake, and another subsample of reviews that they know to be real, so that
the machine can learn to distinguish the patterns from each group. The challenge
is that in practice researchers can not tell for sure whether a review is fake or not,
after all, fake reviews are supposed to be convincing. As a matter of fact, some ex-
perimental evidence suggest that humans are in general poor judges when it comes
to detecting fake reviews (see for instance Ott et al. (n.d.)). So in order to build
a training sample, researches usually spot reviews that are “clearly fake” based on
some some baseline criteria that rely on computational methods. That is, while it
is virtually impossible to determine from the naked eye whether a review is fake or
not, by using automated methods that process big amounts of data, one can find
reviews that are almost certainly fake.
Kaghazgaran, Caverlee and Alfifi (n.d.), for instance, looked at Amazon prod-
ucts that were soliciting fake reviews on the crowdsourcing platform RapidWorkers,
and then classified a review as fake if the reviewer in question had posted reviews to
two or more different products from the list. The premise behind this criterion lies
in the fact that fake reviews are usually mass produced, and that the probability
that a customer happens to review two or more products that were crowdsourcing
fake reviews on the same platform by pure chance is very small, given that Amazon
sells millions of different products. Jindal and Liu (n.d.), on the other hand, classify
a review as fake if its review text is a near duplicate to some other review from the
sample. The intuition behind this criterion lies in the fact that, since fake reviews
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are usually mass produced, fake reviewers have a tendency to copy and paste the
same text to describe different products. In my paper I combine these two criteria
to classify reviews as fake and real, while also adding a new criterion, which, to
the best of my knowledge, has not been exploited in previous literature (though
the method draws some resemblance to the one used by Mukherjee et al. (2012)
Mukherjee, Liu and Glance (n.d.) which regards groups of reviewers that provide
feedback to the same products as suspicious).
1.3 Theoretical Model
The outline of the theoretical model can be described as follows: nature ini-
tially determines the type of the seller as being high or low quality with an exogenous
probability µ0. After learning its type, the seller chooses how much to invest on re-
view manipulation. Then a random signal v1 is generated that is observable to
consumers. The signal v1 is positively correlated with the firm’s quality and its
investment on review manipulation. After observing the signal, potential buyers
compute µ1, their updated beliefs regarding the probability that the seller is high
type. After consumers update their beliefs, the seller chooses the optimum price
p1 from its product and then the heterogenous consumers decide whether or not to
purchase the product. After the firm’s profits are realized for that period, the firm
goes to the next period with a new reputation µ1 and is matched with a new set of
customers, wherein the same process is repeated iteratively.
Figure 1.1 depicts the outline of the model, where η(q, µ) corresponds to the
11























the set of feasible choices for ⌘̃, [0, ⌘], is compact so that, from the maximum theorem,
T (V (q, µ)) = max
⌘̃2[0,⌘]
f(µ, ⌘̃)
is continuous with respect to µ.
Now the operator T : C(X)! C(X) clearly satisfies the Blackwell sufficient conditions
for a  -contraction. Because C(X) is a Banach space, the contraction mapping theorem
guarantees that the operator T (·) has a unique fixed point in C(X).
So given customer’s beliefs, there is a unique solution to the seller’s problem of faking
reviews. We now proceed to describe the equilibrium from this economy.
1.3 Equilibrium
The Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBE) from this economy is characterized by a
policy function ⌘̃(q, µ) and customer’s beliefs ⌘(q, µ) such that:
I) Given customers’ beliefs ⌘(q, µ), the seller adopts the policy function ⌘̃(q, µ), which
is a solution to the Belman equation 8 (i.e., the seller chooses the optimal amount
of fake reviews given customers’ beliefs);
II) ⌘̃(q, µ) = ⌘(q, µ) (i.e., customers correctly guess the strategy adopted by the seller).
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Figure 1: Equilibrium as a function of µ0, when   = .8, qH = 1/3, qL = 1/30,   = 1 and
 2 = .3.






Figure 1.1: Outline of the model.
Later on, section 1.3.6 adds the possibility that at any point a seller can pay a
fixed cost to exit and reenter the market with a new name. Sellers will of course only
choose to do so once their reputation (i.e., their µ’s) have reached a sufficiently low
point. Unsurprisingly, our simulations predict that the reputation of high quality
sellers tend to improve over time, so that they usually find no need to resort to this
tactic. Low quality sellers, on the other hand, tend to constantly exit and reenter
the market with a new name, since their reputation tends to deteriorate over time
as a result of honest reviews.
1.3.1 Firm’s profits as a function of its expected quality
A monopolist wishes to sell a product with quality q that is unknown to
potential customers. Time is discrete and finite, and indexed by t ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · }. At
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each period the firm is matched with a continuum of potential consumers uniformly
distributed between [0, 1] indexed by i. The utility that a consumer located at
i ∈ [0, 1] gets from purchasing a product with quality q and price pt is given by:
ui = q − pt + i.
So implicitly this specification assumes that the firm is located at point 1 from the
unit interval, and that customers located closer to the firm place a higher valuation
for the product. As highlighted by Tirole (1988), the connotation of location does
not have to be geographical: it can represent differences in tastes which causes
consumers to have heterogenous willingness to pay for a certain product.
Letting µt ≡ Et(q) denote the expected quality from the firm given customers’
beliefs at time t, we have that a consumer i will purchase the product if and only if
µt − pt + i ≥ 0
⇐⇒ i ≥ pt − µt.
This implies that if pt > 1 + µt the demand is zero; if pt < µt the demand
is the entire unit interval; and finally, if µt ≤ pt ≤ 1 + µt, the demand is given by
1− (pt − µt). So in the end the demand faced by the firm is given by
D(µt, pt) =

1, if pt < µt
1− pt + µt, if µt ≤ pt ≤ 1 + µt
0, if pt > 1 + µt
Now assume that, after observing µt, the firm chooses the price pt that max-
imizes its revenues D(µt, pt)pt (i.e., the firm is assumed to face zero marginal cost
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of production, so that its profits equals to its total revenue). We also make the
high level assumption that customers do not update their beliefs regarding q after
observing the price pt. This is more a result than an assumption, since it can be
shown that, in the event prices can be used as a signal, there exists a “pooling”
Bayesian equilibrium in the sense that all types with the same reputation charge
the exact same price, given by the price that maximizes their revenue. Intuitively,
for games of incomplete information in which the costs from sending a signal is the
same for all types (in the current situation, the signal being the price), one should
expect all types to send the same signal.2 So if all firm types are to choose the same
price, they might as well choose the price that maximizes their expected revenue.
If 0 ≤ µt ≤ 1, then the optimal price chosen by the firm is given by pt =






1.3.2 Allowing the firm to manipulate customers’ beliefs through fake
reviews
Now assume that at each period the firm has the ability to influence µt by
exerting some effort ηt ≥ 0 in the fabrication of reviews that praise its own products.3
2As an example, in Akerlof’s market of lemons (Akerlof (1970)), all sellers are assumed to charge
the same price, irrespective of the quality of the cars being sold.
3Fake reviews disparaging the firm’s rivals should have a similar effect as to fake reviews that
praise the firm’s products. The main reason as to why I restrict attention on fake positive reviews
is because empirically it is hard to detect the culprits from negative fake reviews (it could be
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We assume the cost from choosing ηt ≥ 0 is given by λη2t . At each period t
consumers get a noisy signal about the quality from the firm, given by
vt = q + ηt + εt,
where q and εt are independent random variables that are not observable by cus-
tomers. The term q + εt from this expression can be interpreted as the part from
the signal generated from honest reviews, while ηt is the fraction from the signal
attributed to review manipulation financed by the seller.4 After observing vt, cus-
tomers update their beliefs regarding the distribution of q to form their expectation
µt of q, and then decide whether or not to purchase the product.
We now closely examine how customers update their beliefs for a specific data
generating process (DGP) for q and εt.
1.3.2.1 Customers’ Bayesian updates
Assume that q ∈ {0, 1}, and let µ0 = E(q) = Prob(q = 1). Also assume
that (εt)
∞
t=1 is iid with εt ∼ N(0, σ2). Then, if in period 1 the firm was to choose
η = ηH when q = 1, and η = ηL when q = 0, we would have from Bayes’ rule that
consumers’ updated beliefs that the firm is of quality q = 1 after observing v1 should
anyone of the firm’s rivals), whereas fake positives are usually orchestrated by the firm that is
having its products praised.
4For tractability, this framework does not model customers’ incentives to leave reviews; instead,
it just assumes that the signal generated from sellers’ honest reviews are stochastic and positively
correlated with their quality. For a theoretical framework that examines buyers’ incentives to post















In general, denoting η : {0, 1}×[0, 1]→ R+ as the amount of effort dedicated in
faking reviews chosen by the seller as a function of its type q ∈ {0, 1} and customers’
beliefs µt−1 ∈ [0, 1], we have that, starting at initial beliefs µ0, customers’ beliefs














vt = q + η(q, µt−1) + εt,
(εt)
∞
t=1 is iid with εt ∼ N(0, σ2), and q is the quality of the firm that is defined
initially in period 0, and it is equal to 1 with probability µ0, and 0 with probability
1− µ0.
Implicitly we have made the high level assumption that consumers expect the
strategy chosen by the seller, η : {0, 1}× [0, 1]→ R+, to only depend on the seller’s
type and on the previous beliefs µt held by customers. As shown in the next section,
given such beliefs pertaining the strategy chosen by the seller, q and µt will indeed
be sufficient statistics for the seller’s optimal policy in period t.
1.3.2.2 Seller’s optimal choice of review manipulation
Once consumers update their beliefs µt+1 in period t + 1, the firm’s expected




So if customers expect the firm to adopt strategy η(q, µ), we have that, starting























vt = q + η̃(q, µ
t−1) + εt, (1.3)
where (εt)
∞
t=0 is iid with εt ∼ N(0, σ2), and µt−1 = (µ1, µ2, · · · , µt−1) is the entire
history of beliefs up to time t−1, and δ ∈ [0, 1) is the firm’s discount factor. At this
point it is important to emphasize the distinction between η̃(q, µt−1) and η(q, µt−1).
η̃(q, µt−1) is the strategy adopted by the firm, while η(q, µt−1) is what customers
think what the strategy from the firm will be, which the firm takes as given. This is
actually one of the main distinctions between this model and standard advertising
models: in a standard advertising model, the amount of advertising is observed by
customers, so the firm takes into account the direct impact that advertising has on
customers’ beliefs pertaining the strategy adopted by the firm; but in the present
model customers do not update their beliefs regarding the strategy taken by the firm
once they observe a signal, since customers can not observe the effort undertaken
by the firm in review fraud (Mayzlin (2006)).
Because the expected payoff from the firm at period t only depends on the
choice of η̃ made by the firm at that period and on the variables q and µt, we
can write the above sequential problem as a functional equation, where the state
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variables are µt and q (notice that q is determined in period 0 and does not change
over time). Therefore, from the principle of optimality, one can find the solution to
the sequential problem 1.1 by solving the following Bellman equation:



















Proposition 1.3.1 Given η(q, µ), and imposing the constraint that the amount of
fake reviews chosen by the firm, η̃, can not exceed a certain upper limit η > 0, i.e,
η̃ ∈ [0, η], we have that the Bellman equation 1.4 has a unique solution.
So given that customers believe that the seller adopts strategy η(q, µ), there
is a unique solution to the seller’s problem of choosing the optimal expenditure on
review manipulation.
One can also easily show that, for the extreme points in which µ = 0 or µ = 1,
the seller’s optimal strategy consists on choosing η̃ = 0, regardless of consumers’
guess regarding the strategy taken by the seller, η(q, µ). Indeed, at those points the
signal generated from reviews can not affect customers’ beliefs, so that the seller
has no incentives to try to influence the signal. This extreme result can be relaxed
by allowing the seller’s type to change over time according to a certain Markovian
process. But qualitatively, adding that additional friction does not affect the main




Informally, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) equilibrium from this econ-
omy is given by a policy function from the seller, and a policy function for customers
such that: 1) Customers’ maximize their expected utility when deciding whether or
not to purchase a product, given their beliefs regarding the seller’s type; 2) the seller
maximizes its expected profits given customers’ beliefs and customers’ strategy; 3)
Customers’ beliefs regarding the seller’s type are correctly updated through Bayes’
rule.
Definition 1.3.1 (Equilibrium) Given the initial probability of a firm being of
high type, µ0, and the firm’s quality q, a PBE from this economy is characterized by
a strategy η : {0, 1} × [0, 1] dictating the effort chosen by the firm at the beginning
of each period as a function of its quality q ∈ {0, 1} and its current reputation
µ ∈ [0, 1], and consumers’ beliefs, such that, for every (q, µ) ∈ {0, 1} × [0, 1],































2σ2 + (1− µt−1)e−
(vt−η(0,µt−1))2
2σ2
, ∀t ≥ 1,
where vt ∼ N(q − η(q, µt−1), σ2).
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1.3.4 Finding the equilibrium numerically
An alternative way of interpreting the PBE concept is to think of the seller
as choosing a policy function η̃(q, µ), and then having customers guessing a policy
function η(q, µ) chosen by the seller, and then requiring that:
I) Given η(q, µ), the strategy adopted by the seller, η̃(q, µ), is a solution to
the Bellman equation 1.4 (i.e., the seller chooses the optimal amount of fake
reviews given consumers’ expectations regarding the strategy chosen by the
seller);
II) η̃(q, µ) = η(q, µ) (i.e., customers correctly guess the strategy adopted by the
seller).
This way of thinking about the PBE motivates the usage of the following
algorithm for finding the equilibrium:
Algorithm 1 (Finding the PBE numerically)
1. Guess a strategy η(·, ·).
2. Given this strategy, solve the Bellman equation 1.4 (say, by iterating the value
function) to obtain a new guess η̃(·, ·) for the policy function, then go to the
next step.
3. Compare η̃(·, ·) obtained in the previous step with η(·, ·). If these two policy
functions are sufficiently close to each other (i.e., if sup(q,µ) |η̃(q, µ)− η(q, µ)|
is sufficiently small), an approximation to the fixed point representing the
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seller’s equilibrium strategy has been found, so stop the algorithm; else redefine
η(·, ·) = η̃(·, ·) and repeat step 2.
Applying this algorithm, we obtain the equilibrium strategy from the seller
as depicted in figure 1.2. As it is clear from this figure, regardless of its type, a
seller optimally chooses to exert more effort on review manipulation for intermediate
values of µ, the intuition being that, for very low levels of reputation the seller finds
it too costly to signal that it is of high quality, whereas a seller that has already
accumulated a very good reputation does not need to prove that it sells a high
quality product. In mathematical terms, reputation levels of µ = 0 or µ = 1 are
absorbing states: once a seller achieves those reputation levels, they can not be
altered.










Figure 1.2: Equilibrium as a function of µ, when δ = .8, λ = 1 and σ2 = 1.
Another interesting feature from this equilibrium is that low quality sellers do
not necessarily exert more effort on review manipulation. Which type spends most
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effort on review manipulation depends on the current level of reputation held by
the seller. Indeed, given a very low level of reputation, a high quality seller should
spend more effort on review manipulation, and the opposite should hold when the
seller has a very high reputation.
The intuition being this result can be explained as follows. Imagine that a seller
currently possesses a very low reputation. In that case, the disutility from getting a
bad signal is not so great, since the seller is already close to “rock bottom”. The gain
in utility, however, from getting a good signal is more promising, as it can help the
seller to separate itself from low types. In that case, because it is too costly for low
types to pretend that they are high types, a high type should spend proportionally
more on review manipulation. Analogously, if the seller has already accumulated a
good reputation, then the marginal benefit from getting a good signal is relatively
small, as compared to the disutility from getting a very bad signal. Because high
quality sellers are very unlikely to get a very bad signal, it should be the low types,
on that case, that will put more effort on the fabrication of fake reviews.
This result has implications on the dynamic choices made by the seller. Indeed,
if the initial µ0 is very low (i.e., if a firm in the market is most likely to be of low
quality), then high quality types should be expected to be the ones spending most
effort on review manipulation throughout the periods, as depicted in figure 1.20(a).
If, however, µ0 is large, then it is the low quality sellers that should be expected
to spend most effort on review manipulation over the periods, as depicted in figure
1.3(c).
From figure 1.3 one can also see that both types spend most effort on review
22










(a) µ0 = .2











(b) µ0 = .5











(c) µ0 = .5
Figure 1.3: Average simulated effort of review manipulation chosen throughout the
periods, starting at different µ0’s, when δ = .8, λ = 1 and σ
2 = 1. ηH corresponds to
the average effort of review manipulation chosen by a high type seller (i.e., a seller
with q = 1), while ηL corresponds to the average effort chosen by a low type seller
(i.e., a seller with q = 0).
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manipulation at the initial stages after they have they have opened their businesses,
so as to maximize the impact from each fake review.
Now turning the attention to the evolution of reputation held by the seller, one
can see from figure 1.4 that the reputation from a high quality seller tends to improve
over time, while the reputation from a low quality seller gradually deteriorates.
This happens because, as high quality sellers systematically receive positive reviews
praising their products, their reputation tends to improve over time. For low quality
sellers, however, it is too costly to maintain a high reputation in the long run due to
the fact that they systematically receive negative reviews from honest consumers.
So the model essentially predicts that in the long run customers learn the truth
regarding the quality from sellers.
One can also compare the rate at which buyers learn the truth about the
seller in this model with the case in which sellers are not allowed to fake reviews,
say, because the monitoring of fake reviews is very intense or because the punishment
applied to those caught faking reviews is very harsh, so that sellers have no incentives
to fake reviews. Figure 1.5 compares the evolution of reputation for a high and low
quality seller, when fake reviews is allowed to take place, and when it is not. As
it is clear from these plots, the rate at which buyers learn the truth about the
seller depends on the initial probability that the seller is of high type. Indeed, as
discussed previously, high types will have incentives to fake more reviews than low
types for low levels of reputation (see figure 1.2). In that case reviews are actually
more informative when sellers are allowed to fake reviews, as the gap between the
signal generated by high quality sellers and low quality sellers is greater. So in that
24
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(a) µ0 = .2













 from q H
 from q L
(b) µ0 = .5













 from q H
 from q L
(c) µ0 = .5
Figure 1.4: The average simulated evolution of reputation, starting at different µ0’s,
when δ = .8, λ = 1 and σ2 = 1. µH corresponds to the average simulated reputation
from a high type seller (i.e., a seller with q = 1), while µL corresponds to the average
simulated reputation from a low type seller (i.e., a seller with q = 0).
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case, buyers learn the truth about the type from the seller at a faster rate when
fake reviews are allowed to take place, as depicted in figure 1.5(a). On the contrary,
for high levels of reputation, it is the low type seller that has more incentives to
fake reviews. So in that case allowing sellers to fake reviews closes the gap between
the signal generated from high and low types, thus making reviews less informative,
which in turn decreases the rate at which buyers learn the truth about the sellers’
types as depicted in figure 1.5(b).















q=1 and no fake reviews
q=0 and no fake reviews
(a) µ0 = .2















q=1 and no fake reviews
q=0 and no fake reviews
(b) µ0 = .5
Figure 1.5: The average simulated evolution of reputation, when the seller is allowed
and not allowed to fake reviews, starting at different µ0’s, when δ = .8, λ = 1 and
σ2 = 1.
1.3.5 When consumers do not anticipate review manipulation
The results form the previous section were built with the assumption that
consumers know the strategy taken by the seller in equilibrium, i.e., that consumers
correctly anticipate that some reviews may be fake, and that high and low quality
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sellers manipulate reviews in different proportions. But one can also imagine sce-
narios in which customers are unaware of the existence of fraudulent reviews, or
at least greatly underestimate how prevalent they are. So this section presents the
results from the model in a scenario in which consumers incorrectly believe that the
effort on review manipulation is zero for both high and low quality sellers.
Figure 1.6 displays the equilibrium strategy from both high and low quality
sellers in this new environment with naive consumers, together with the equilibrium
strategy from the standard version of the model presented in the previous section.
At least for the set of parameters under consideration (δ = .8 and λ = σ2 = 1), when
consumers are unaware of the existence of fake reviews, high quality sellers tend to
engage in more review manipulation, while low quality sellers end up faking less
reviews. As this diminishes the gap between the signals from high and low quality
sellers, consumers take longer to learn the true type from the seller, as displayed in
figure 1.7.
But qualitatively speaking, the results from either version of the model are
very similar. Figure 1.8 displays the seller’s average simulated effort on review
manipulation through time for both scenarios. In both scenarios the seller tends to
fake more reviews at the beginning, and as its reputation gradually improves (for a
high type seller) or deteriorate (for a low type seller) it gradually reduces its effort
on review manipulation as time goes by.
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Figure 1.6: Equilibrium as a function of µ, when δ = .8, λ = 1 and σ2 = 1, when
consumers know the strategy taken by the seller, and when consumers are naive
and believe the seller does not engage in review manipulation (i.e., they believe
η(q, µ) = 0 for all q, µ).
1.3.6 Allowing the firm to exit and reenter the market with a new
name
Now assume that the market starts with N sellers. As before, at each period
a seller acts as a monopolist on its own market and they are each matched with
a continuum of consumers with mass 1, and a seller’s optimal profits given that
customers believe that its expected quality is µ is given by ω(µ) = (1 + µ)2/4 (see
section 1.3.1). At the beginning of each period, each seller retires with an exogenous
probability pe. At every period, [peN ] new sellers enter the market, where they are
each high type (q = 1) with probability µ0 and low type (q = 0) with probability
28

















(a) µ0 = .2

















(b) µ0 = .8
Figure 1.7: The average simulated evolution of reputation when the seller is faced
with sophisticated (black lines) or naive (red lines) customers, starting at different
µ0’s, when δ = .8, λ = 1, σ
2 = 1. µH corresponds to the average reputation from
high quality sellers, while µL corresponds to the average reputation form low quality
sellers.
1− µ0. But now sellers can “pretend” to retire and reenter the market with a new
name, after paying a fixed cost C > 0. If consumers were oblivious of this scheme,
they would believe a newcomer to be of high quality with ability µ0. But it is
assumed that customers correctly anticipate that some firms may try to exit and
reenter the market with a new name in order to hide a potential bad reputation
obtained from previous reviews.
For technical reasons, it is assumed that at each period there is a small prob-
ability ρs that the seller is not allowed to exit and reenter the market. Without this
assumption buyers would be allowed to have any beliefs whatsoever regarding the
effort spent on review manipulation from a seller with a sufficiently low level of rep-
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(a) µ0 = .2













(b) µ0 = .8
Figure 1.8: The average simulated evolution of effort on review manipulation when
the seller is faced with sophisticated (black lines) or naive (red lines) customers,
starting at different µ0’s, when δ = .8, λ = 1, σ
2 = 1. µH corresponds to the
average reputation from high quality sellers, while µL corresponds to the average
reputation form low quality sellers.
utation. Indeed, once a seller’s reputation goes below a certain threshold, the seller
optimally chooses to exit and reenter the market with a new name. So if sellers were
always allowed to do that, in equilibrium one would never observe a seller with a very
low level of reputation choosing some effort of review manipulation, which would
then allow buyers to have any arbitrary beliefs regarding how much a seller would
spend on fake reviews on those hypothetical scenarios. Because arbitrary beliefs
pertaining decisions taken outside the equilibrium path can potentially affect the
decisions made on the equilibrium path, it is important to impose some discipline
on customers’ beliefs on contingencies that are never reached in equilibrium. One
way to accomplish that is by using equilibrium refinements. For example, instead
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of assuming that agents play a PBE, one could assume that they play a sequential
equilibrium. But for the current model, imposing discipline on customers’ beliefs
can be more easily achieved by simply assuming that there is a small probability ρs
that the seller is not allowed to exit and reenter the market. This way, all feasible
contingencies can be reached with positive probability, which implies that customers’
beliefs regarding the actions taken by the firm in each contingency have to coincide
with the firm’s actual actions taken on those contingencies.
Henceforth a seller is defined as an apparent newcomer for period t if the seller
has either started selling its product in period t, or if the seller was already selling
its product before period t but changed its name in period t, so as to erase his
past reputation. In that case, deriving the reputation from apparent newcomers can
be difficult, since the reputation form those sellers should depend on the strategies
chosen by the firms in equilibrium. So in order to compute the reputation from
those firms I rely on Monte Carlo simulations. More precisely, I add an outer loop
to algorithm 1 and iteratively compute the realized expected quality from newcomers
in the long run to then use that statistic as a new guess for the reputation from
newcomers, and keep repeating this process until a convergence criterion is reached.
Algorithm 2 (When firms can exit and reenter the market)
1. Guess µ̃0, the probability that a an apparent newcomer is of high type in the
long run (notice that because the term “an apparent newcomer” also encom-
passes old sellers that pretend to be new ones, µ̃0 6= µ0).
2. Given µ̃0, compute the strategy taken by the firm by implementing a procedure
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similar to algorithm 1, then go to the next step.
3. Given the sellers’ strategy conduct Monte Carlo simulations to compute µ̃0
′,
the long run expected probability that an apparent newcomer is of high type. If
|µ̃0′ − µ̃0| is sufficiently small, stop the algorithm, else redefine µ̃0 = µ̃0′ and
repeat step 2.
Applying this algorithm to a given set of parameters, we find a similar optimal
strategy for the seller, as the one obtained previously, as depicted in figure 1.9.










Figure 1.9: Equilibrium as a function of µ, when δ = .95, λ = 1, σ2 = 1, µ0 = .5
and C = .01.
But because now sellers can exit and reenter the market with a new name
once their reputation has been squandered, the dynamics from their effort on review
manipulation changes. In particular, the reputation from low quality sellers tend
to reach low levels constantly, which leads them to periodically exit and reenter the
market with a new name, always concentrating review manipulation at the time
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they reenter the market, so as to maximize the impact from each fake review. This
phenomenon can be visualized in figure 1.10(a), which depicts the simulated effort
of review manipulation from a single high and low type seller, while figure 1.11(b)
depicts their corresponding level of reputation, assuming they are never selected to
retire (recall that there is an exogenous probability pe that at each given period the
seller retires).











(a) µ0 = .2









 form q H
 from q L
(b) µ0 = .5
Figure 1.10: The evolution of the effort of review manipulation and reputation
chosen by a high and a low quality seller, when δ = .95, λ = 1, σ2 = 1, µ0 = .5,
pe = .5, C = .01, N = 100.
Figure 1.11 averages the strategy from sellers and their respective reputation
over several simulations. As it is clear from those plots, consumers on average do not
learn the type from low quality sellers in the long run, as they systematically exit
and reenter the market with a new name once their reputation has been squandered.
This result suggests that building obstacles that prevent sellers from anonymously
selling their products under different account names should be pursued by online
33
platforms such as Amazon, so as to guarantee that reviews are informative.
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(b) µ0 = .5
Figure 1.11: The evolution of the average effort of review manipulation and reputa-
tion from high and low quality firms, when δ = .95, λ = 1, σ2 = 1, µ0 = .5, pe = .5,
C = .01, N = 100.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
The theoretical model from the previous section provides a series of predictions
regarding the pattern form review manipulation observed in online rating platforms.
One of them is that the process of review manipulation is usually more concentrated
during the initial periods following a seller’s entrance (or reentrance with a new
brandname) into the market, as sellers wish to maximize the impact from each
fake review (see figures 1.3 and 1.11(a)). Another prediction is that the amount
of effort dedicated in review manipulation does not vary monotonically with the
seller’s reputation. Indeed, from figures 1.2 and 1.9, sellers with very high or very
low reputation levels will usually spend less effort manipulating reviews. For sellers
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with low reputation, that happens because they find it too costly to pretend that
they are high quality types, in which case they optimally choose to either give up
trying to convince buyers that they are high quality sellers, or to exit and reenter the
market with a new brand name in order to reenter the game with a fresh reputation.
Analogously, for sellers with a very good reputation, the marginal benefit from faking
reviews is small, since at that point buyers are already pretty much convinced that
sellers are of high quality.
In order to verify to which extent those two predictions are observed empir-
ically, I first scraped data from reviews posted on Amazon from a set of products
that I classified as suspicious on the basis that they were soliciting positive fake
reviews for their products on the internet (namely, on Facebook and Rapidworkers).
Using that data I then apply a set of criteria to identify fake reviews from those
sellers. Once fake reviews are identified, I then run a Logit regression to estimate
the probability that a review is fake as a function of the product’s reputation and
the time since the product was first introduced in the market.
Because this dataset is comprised exclusively of suspicious products, it allows
the researcher to detect fake reviews more easily. Indeed, if the researcher knows
that two different products were involved in review solicitation, and he also observes
that the same customer posted reviews on these two suspicious products, then the
researcher can safely assume that those reviews are almost certainly fake, given
that Amazon has a million of other products from which that customer could have
chosen from, thus making the observed event very unlikely to have happened merely
by chance. Clearly this detection criterion wouldn’t be effective at all if applied to
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products for which one has no prior knowledge about their involvement in review
solicitation.
Therefore, an advantage about using this dataset to study fake reviews is that
it allows the researcher to detect fake reviews more easily, which in turn diminishes
the occurrences of classification errors in the sample (i.e., it diminishes the number
of instances in which the researcher incorrectly classifies a fake review as real and
vice versa).
But using this dataset also has a few caveats, one of them being that it may
be susceptible to selection bias. Indeed, by focusing the analysis on sellers who are
known to solicit fake reviews on the internet, the resulting sample may end up with
an overrepresentation of fake reviews. For that and other reasons, on section 1.4.4
I then repeat a similar estimation analysis using a different set of products from
Amazon, one in which sellers were not targeted in the sampling process.
Consistent with the theoretical model, the results from both regressions indi-
cate that the probability of a review being fake decreases with time, and it varies
non-monotonically with the seller’s reputation, where very high or very low reputa-
tion levels are associated with a lower probability of the review being fake.
1.4.1 Database
This study uses a brand new dataset of reviews scraped from Amazon. The
dataset contains information from 16,935 reviews from 206 different products. In-
formation from each review includes the review text, the review title, the date the
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review was posted, the number of stars given by the reviewer, whether the review
came from a verified purchase, whether the review contained pictures or videos,
whether the review received positive feedback, etc.
As to the 206 products for which reviews were collected, they were individually
selected based on the fact that their sellers were soliciting fake review on online
platforms such as RapidWorkers and Facebook. Knowing that these sellers were
soliciting fake reviews online allows one to more easily detect which of the reviews
posted were fake (see section 1.4.1.1), which then allows the researcher to identify
the characteristics from fake reviews.
Figure 1.12 provides an example of an Amazon seller soliciting fake reviews
through RapidWorkers.
Figure 1.12: An example of a seller soliciting fake reviews through RapidWork-
ers.com.
Figure 1.12 helps to illustrate two aspects about fake reviews solicited through
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RapidWorkers: 1) when sellers use this website to solicit fake reviews, they provide
a link specifying the url from the product in question, which can then be used by
the researcher to identify the seller responsible for the fake review solicitation. 2)
Moreover, notice that the amount paid per fake review is usually very small, given
that this website focus on the solicitation of non-verified purchase reviews, which
are virtually costless to fabricate. This small amount paid for unverified purchase
reviews is consistent with anecdotal evidence provided in the News (see for instance
A Rave, a Pan, or Just a Fake? (New York Times, 2011)) and other scientific
research that also relies on RapidWorkers to spot fake reviews, such as Kaghazgaran
et al. (2017) Kaghazgaran, Caverlee and Alfifi (n.d.).
As to verified purchase reviews, since they are perceived as being more reliable,
and since they are more costly to fabricate, sellers are usually willing to pay a higher
price for those type of fraudulent reviews, oftentimes by completely reimbursing
reviewers after they have purchased the product and left their positive reviews.
Figure 1.13 shows an example of a seller soliciting verified purchase fake reviews
through a community on Facebook dedicated solely to facilitate the transaction of
Amazon fake reviews.
Unlike Rapidworkers, on Facebook sellers tend to be less brazen when it comes
to fake review solicitation. For starters, on Facebook sellers usually talk using code
language. For the example in figure 1.13, “PP” stands for PayPal, which means
that the buyer will be reimbursed through PayPal after purchasing the product
through Amazon and leaving a positive review. “US” means that the purchase
must be purchased in the US. And “PM” stands for private messaging, meaning
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12/19/2017 (52) Amazon Reviews and Deals Group-US/UK/AU/DE/FR/IT/CA/ES
https://www.facebook.com/groups/310972782605660/permalink/535061520196784/?sale_post_id=535061520196784 1/3
Figure 1.13: An example of a seller soliciting fake reviews through a Facebook
community.
that whoever is interested in the gig should contact the seller through Facebook’s
private message system.
On top of that, sellers that solicit fake reviews through Facebook usually do
not provide the url from their product. Instead they only display a picture and
sometimes a small product description. This makes it harder for researchers and
Amazon staff to detect the sellers responsible for the reviews solicitation. However,
by doing a Google image search, one can identify some of these products. Indeed,
for the product in question, a Google image search leads to the page depicted in
figure 1.14. From the figure, one can see that, surprisingly, the product in question
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has an Amazon best-seller stamp.
Figure 1.14: One of the products from figure 1.13 turns out to be a bestseller on
Amazon.
So by doing a google image search on some of the products listed in Facebook
communities, I was able to identify sellers that were probably soliciting fake reviews
for their products.
Finally, another set of suspicious sellers were targeted using information posted
from Amazon’s seller forum, where users would complain about the credibility of
some of the reviews from certain products. As an example, a post from the forum
would read:
“...This item gets over 5 reviews a day verified reviews and they are all
5 stars how is that even possible. Link below:
https://www.amazon.com/Ashwagandha-EnhancerArtichokeEnhancedSupplement/dp/B06XC9CZWN/
Is this legit or fake reviews. Am I missing out on some method to have
this many reviews or are they all paid for...”
Edited by: Wholesale promo on Apr 30, 2017 1:03 PM
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So I searched for similar posts and targeted the products being flagged as sus-
picious by concerned users as well as some other products that were being reviewed
by the same set of customers.
In the end I ended up with a database of reviews 26,971 from 247 different
products. Some of those products were targeted based on the fact that they were
either soliciting fake reviews through RapidWorkers or Facebook, or they were be-
ing flagged as suspicious by concerned users on Amazon’s seller forum. Table 1.1
provides some summary statistics about the dataset.
RapidWorkers Facebook Amazon Seller Forum Total
Number of products 61 165 21 247
Number of reviews 4,724 20,685 1,562 26,971
Table 1.1: Number of products/reviews collected from each source
1.4.1.1 Fake review detection
As mentioned earlier, this study focuses in analyzing the patterns from positive
fake reviews only. While fraudulent negative reviews aimed at a seller’s rivals should
have a similar effect on sales as compared to fabricating positive reviews praising
the seller’s own products; for the first tactic it is usually difficult to determine the
agent(s) responsible for the review fabrication: they could have originated from any
of the seller’s rivals, or even some disgruntled consumer. For positive fake reviews,
on the other hand, it is invariably the seller receiving the positive fake reviews that
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is behind their solicitation.
Now, given Amazon 1 to 5 star rating metric, classifying a review as positive
or negative can be subjective: if the average rating given on Amazon was around
2 stars, then a 3 star would actually be considered a good review. But given that
the great majority of reviews posted on Amazon are 5 star reviews (see figures 1.15
and 1.19), I classify a review as positive if and only if it has more than 4 stars.5 So
reviews with 4 or 5 stars will be our candidates for positive fake reviews.
Depending on the source that led us to include a certain product in our list, a
different set of criteria was used to determine whether a positive review from that
product was fake or not. The combination of the two criteria listed below was used
to categorize reviews from products in which fake review solicitation was happened
on RapidWorkers or Facebook:
I) If two different reviews were sufficiently similar to one another in terms of
their text Jaccard similarity index, and the reviews in question had more than
5 words, and they were both from products in which fake review solicitation
happened in the same online platform, and they both gave the seller at least
3 stars, then those reviews were classified as fake.6
5Jabr and Zheng Jabr and Zheng (2014) adopt the same criteria for classifying an Amazon book
review as positive.
6To compute the Jaccard similarity index I used shingles containing 4 consecutive words, and
I employed a hashing algorithm that addresses the computational burden of computing the actual
Jaccard Similarity index by computing an unbiased estimator of the index. For details, check
section A.0.2 from the appendix.
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II) If a reviewer id was linked to two or more reviews from two or more different
products that were soliciting fake reviews on the same online platform, and
if the corresponding reviews gave the sellers a grade of at least 3 stars, then
they were classified as fake.
All other reviews were classified as real. Of course, this process inevitably lead
us to incorrectly classify some actual fake reviews as real. But one should keep in
mind that, when it comes to fake review detection, no classification is perfect. Cer-
tain methods, however, can be implemented to correct for potential misclassification
errors, as discussed later in section 1.4.3.
As to reviews from products that were being discussed on Amazon seller fo-
rums, a more conservative approach had to be implemented in order to classify them
as fake or real. Indeed, from the way in which products were targeted using Amazon
seller forums (see section 1.4.1), intersections among the products reviewed by cus-
tomers are to be expected even when the reviews in question are real. So if one finds
a buyer reviewing two different products from the list of products targeted using
Amazon seller forum, that does not constitute a strong indication that the review is
fake, so that criterion II) listed above does not effectively detect fake reviews for that
sample. So for products targeted using Amazon seller forum, while still preserving
criterion I), I replaced criterion II) for the more conservative classification rule:
II*) Consider an undirected graph where each reviewer is linked to the products
that they review. If a cycle containing 2 or 3 reviewers is formed, then the
corresponding reviews responsible for that cycle are classified as fake.
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Applying the criteria described above to our dataset, 3,834 of the total of
26,971 reviews are classified as fake, while the remaining 23,137 reviews are classified
as real. That is, approximately 14% of the reviews from the sample were classified
as fake. Though that is a lot of fake reviews, one should keep in mind that, when
building our sample we deliberately targeted suspicious products, so as to simplify
the task of detecting fake reviews. Therefore one should not interpret this percentage
as an accurate depiction as to how prevalent fake reviews are in online platforms
such as Amazon.
1.4.1.2 Measuring reputation
The theoretical model from section 1.3 defined a seller’s reputation as cus-
tomer’s beliefs that the seller is of high type. Of course, such probability is not
observable in practice, which motivates the usage of some statistic that captures
this reputation. One possibility would be to use the average number of stars re-
ceived by a seller at any given time. The problem with this statistic, however, is
that it would imply that if a product had a single review, and that review happened
to give the seller 5 stars, then the seller would have the highest reputation score
that one could possibly get.
So instead I use the following statistic as a proxy for reputation: 1) each seller
starts with a score of zero. 2) For each review received by the seller, the seller’s
score is added or subtracted by a certain number depending on whether the review
gave him 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 stars. A 1-star review reduces the score from the seller by
44
2 points, a 2-star review reduces the raw score by 1 point, a 3-star review does not
affect the score, a 4-star review adds 1 point to the score, and a 5-star review adds
2 points to the score. 3) After computing the raw score from seller s at time t, rs,t,





the final statistic used to measure the seller’s reputation, where σr is the standard
deviation of the raw score rs,t.
Because most reviews on Amazon tend to have 5 stars, as depicted in histogram
1.15, the lower ψ is, the more the distribution of reputation µ̃ will be concentrated
around 1, the maximum reputation level possible. To prevent such distribution from
having positive mass at 1, the smoothing parameter was set at ψ = 30, for which
the density estimate is depicted in figure 1.16. As is visible from this figure, very
low levels of reputation are rarely observed, which again is associated with the fact
that the great majority of reviews posted on Amazon tend to be 5 star reviews.
As a final observation, notice that this measure of reputation does not take
into account that some reviews may be fake. So on that regard it is more aligned
with the version of the model in which consumers are naive and do not expect some
reviews to be fake (see section 1.3.5).
1.4.1.3 Covariates
Some covariates were added in our regressions in order to control for endoge-
nous shocks. Two of these covariates use text analysis to estimate the probability
45
Figure 1.15: Histogram of number of stars in the sample. Consistent with previous
results from the literature, the distribution of number of stars given by reviewers
has a J-shape format.













Figure 1.16: Estimated density of µ̃ using the Epanechnikov kernel density.
that a review is real conditional on its content. One of these two variables uses
content form the review title, while the other uses content form the review text. I
call these variables “reliability from review title” and “reliability from review text”.
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Each of these variables are dummies that assume value 1 if the contents of the re-
view text (review title, resp.) are more likely to have been generated by legitimate
reviews. For both of these measures I also imposed the restriction that a review
with 1 to 3 stars is real with probability 1 (recall that this paper focuses on the
detection of positive fake reviews, since for those cases it is clear who is responsible
for the solicitation of fake reviews: the seller who is getting its product praised by
dishonest reviewers). The method used for computing these dummies is the näıve
Bayes’ estimate. In spite of its name, this statistic has proven to perform surpris-
ingly well as compared to more sophisticated methods. This, added to its simplicity,
has lead this statistic to be commonly employed in the computer science literature.
Other covariates include whether or not a review contained a picture or a
photograph. Controlling for these variables is important since, from several examples
that I found on Facebook and RapidWorkers, buyers who were soliciting fake reviews
would occasionally pay extra if a photograph or video was added to the review,
supposedly to make the reviews more convincing.
Another important variable consists on the amount of feedback received by a
review.7 The impact that this variable should have on the probability of a review
being fake is ambiguous. Indeed, on the one hand, one would expect that more
positive feedback would imply that the others found the review to be useful, and
therefore less likely to be fake. But on the other hand, one can see cases in which
sellers solicit positive feedback on positive reviews, as depicted in figure 1.17. Be-
cause of this, it could actually be the case that more positive feedback are associated
7As I write this in late 2018, Amazon only displays positive feedback, not negative ones.
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with a higher probability of a review being fake. To their surprise, Jindal and Liu
(2008) Jindal and Liu (n.d.) find that the latter occurs in their Amazon dataset, i.e.,
they find that more positive feedback actually increases the probability of a given


























































Figure 1.17: An exa ple of a seller soliciting positive feedback to reviews praising
its products.
An additional variable consists on the number of words from a review text.
Again, the effect of this variable on the probability of a review being fake is ambigu-
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ous. On the one hand one could argue that, since fake reviewers are usually mass
produced, the length from fake reviews are expected to be shorter. Some of the
examples discussed earlier, however, suggest that the opposite can occur. Indeed,
given that sellers occasionally ask for pictures or videos to be added to the reviews,
or ask for positive feedback to be given to favorable reviews, it seems that sellers
are not only interested in a acquiring a high volume of positive fake reviews, but
they also want those reviews to be convincing. So it may actually be the case that
the text from fake reviews are on average longer than real reviews, due to the extra
effort put by fake reviewers so as to make their reviews look more convincing.
Last, but not least, a dummy that determines whether or not a review came
from a verified purchase is added to the vector of covariates. This variable is poten-
tially a good predictor as to whether or not a review is fake. Indeed, since unverified
purchase fake reviews are usually a lot cheaper to acquire as compared to verified
purchase ones, one would expect unverified purchases to be more likely to be fake.
One force, however, that can potentially change the effect from this variable is the
selection bias present in our sample. Indeed, most of our sample consists on prod-
ucts for which fake reviews were being solicited on Facebook. Given that the reviews
solicited on Facebook were mostly (if not exclusively) verified purchase ones, this
can cause our data to have an overrepresentation of verified purchase fake reviews.
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1.4.2 Logit model
Let yi,s,t be a binary variable that indicates whether review i from product s
posted at time t is fake or not, i.e., yi,s,t = 1 if the review is fake, and yi,s,t = 0 if
the review is real. Next, define the latent variable
y∗i,s,t = τi,s,tβ0 + β1µ̃s,t + β1µ̃
2
s,t + zi,s,tγ + vi,s,t, (1.9)
where τi,s,t is the time it took for review i from product s to be posted since the first
review received by seller s, µ̃i,s,t is the statistic derived from expression 1.8, which
measures the reputation from seller s up to time t; zi,s,t is the vector of covariates




1, if y∗i,s,t ≥ 0
0, if y∗i,s,t < 0
.
Given the predictions from the theoretical model, one would want to test the
following hypothesis: 1) β0 < 0, so that older reviews are more likely to be fake, and
2) that β1 is positive, while β2 is negative, in such a way that sellers with very low
or very high reputation have less incentives to fake reviews. Therefore, denoting xi,s












[yi,s,t log(F (xi,s,tβ + zi,s,tγ)) + (1− yi,s,t) log(1− F (xi,s,tβ + zi,s,tγ))] .
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Dependent variable:










Dummy for text reliability −2.607∗∗∗
(0.059)
Dummy for title reliability −1.488∗∗∗
(0.065)




Has images or videos 0.607∗∗∗
(0.086)
Observations 18,440 18,440
Log Likelihood −5,241.875 −7,552.646
Akaike Inf. Crit. 10,501.750 15,113.290
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 1.2: Regression Results
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Table 1.2 displays the results from Logit regressions (i.e., assuming that F (·)
is the cdf from a logit distribution). Since the estimates form all specifications are
very similar we will analyze the results from a single specification, namely column
(1) from the table. Probit regressions also yield similar results and are therefore
omitted.
Consistent with the predictions from the theoretical model, the time coefficient
is negative and statistically significant, so that the longer it takes for a review to be
posted since the seller entered the market, the less likely the review is to be classified
as fraudulent. This result is also consistent with the plot depicted in figure 1.18,
which displays the average proportion of fake reviews chosen by sellers as a function
of time. As it is clear from the graph, the bulk of fake reviews is mostly concentrated
around the few weeks following a seller’s entrance (or reentrance) into the market.
The small increase on fake reviews at the right tail of the graph can be attributed
to the fact that this measure becomes increasingly less precise as time advances,
since the number of observations used to compute this statistic decreases as time
increases (i.e., the longer the time span, the less sellers there are in the sample that
have lived long enough to be included in the average).
Turning back to the results from the regression, the coefficients for reputation
and reputation squared suggest an inverted U-shape relationship between reputation
and effort on review manipulation. This is consistent with the model’s prediction
that sellers that have either accumulated a very high or very low reputation have
less incentives to fake reviews.
As to coefficients from covariates, they mostly have the sign that one would
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Figure 1.18: Average proportion and absolute number of fake reviews chosen by
sellers as a function of the time since sellers’ first review. Time was discretized
into biweekly intervals. The gray area corresponds to bootstrapped 95% confidence
intervals for the average proportion of fake reviews.
normally expect. For instance, the coefficients for the reliability index dummies,
which capture the probability that a review is real based on their text content, have
negative signs, which means that reviews with more reliable review texts and review
titles are unsurprisingly less likely to be fake (see section A.0.3.1 for a detailed
explanation as to how these dummies were constructed).
A review coming from a verified purchase decreases the probability of a review
being fake, most likely due to the fact that verified purchase reviews are more costly
to fake. And finally, a review having images or videos increases the probability of a
review being fake. That is probably due to the fact that sellers occasionally solicit
pictures or videos to be added to fake reviews, so as to make them more convincing.
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1.4.3 Logit model correcting for classification error
The logit model presented in section 1.4.2 assumed that the variable yi,s,t used
to classify reviews as fake or real was flawless, i.e., that there were no instances in
which some fake reviews were incorrectly classified as real, and vice versa. But in
practice the researcher can not determine with absolute certainty whether a review
is fake or real, so that one should expect a certain degree of misclassification to be
present in the dataset. In our case, even though reviews were only classified as fake
when very strong evidence supported that those reviews were in fact fake (see section
1.4.1.1), it is very likely that some of the reviews from our sample were incorrectly
classified as real. So in essence our variable of interest yi,s,t is not observable. What
is observable instead is yoi,s,t, an indicator variable that equals 1 if the researcher
classified review i from product s posted at time t as fake, and zero otherwise,
where occasionally we may have yoi,s,t 6= yi,s.
Because the presence of misclassifications of the dependent binary variable
causes the probit and Logit estimates to be biased and inconsistent, I use an es-
timation approach proposed by Tennekoon and Rosenman (2016) that corrects for
endogenous misclassifications. Formally, let zi,t,s be a vector of covariates that can
predict whether or not a review is fake, such as the length from the review, whether
or not the review was from a verified purchase, whether or not the review contained
a picture or a video, etc. Then we assume that the probability that a review is
classified as fake when the review is in indeed fake conditional on the vector of
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covariates zi,s,t is given by:
Prob(yoi,s,t = 1|yi,s,t = 1, zi,s,t) = Fo(zi,s,tγ),
where Fo(·) is a cdf. Because reviews from our sample were only classified as fake
when strong evidence supported that those reviews were indeed fraudulent (see
section 1.4.1.1), I assume that a real review from our sample is never incorrectly
classified as fake, i.e.,
Prob(yoi,s,t = 0|yi,s,t = 0, zi,s,t) = 1.
Therefore, letting xi,s,t denote the vector of explanatory variables of interest
(namely, the time it took for the review was posted, and the categorical dummies
indicating the cohort of reputation from the product at the time the review was
posted), we have that the overall probability of observing yoi,s,t = 1 given the covari-
ates from the model is given by
Prob(yoi,s,t = 1|xi,s,t, zi,s,t) = Prob(yi,s,t = 1|xi,s,t)Prob(yoi,s,t = 1|yi,s,t = 1, zi,s,t)
= F (xi,s,tβ)Fo(zi,s,tγ)





yoi,s,t log(F (xi,s,tβ)Fo(zi,s,tγ)) + (1− yoi,s,t) log(1− F (xi,s,tβ)Fo(zi,s,tγ))
]
,
and maximize it to obtain estimates of β and γ.
The results from this regression are depicted in table 1.3. Again, the results
from the regression are very similar to the ones obtained earlier in section 1.4.2,
table 1.2. Looking at the variables of interest, they exhibit the same patterns as the
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ones derived earlier: older reviews are more likely to be fake, and the probability of
a review being fake is smaller for very low and very high levels of reputation µi,s,t.
variable estimates p-values std errors
x
Constant -164.6*** 3.58e-14 2.17e+01
µi,s,t 828.9*** 2.25e-12 1.18e+02
µ2i,s,t -663.9*** 3.37e-12 9.54e+01
time -0.016*** 3.506e-18 1.82e-03
z
Constant 2.07*** 0.0000 7.02e-02
Dummy for text reliability -2.605*** 0.0000 6.29e-02
Dummy for title reliability -1.53*** 0.0000 6.86e-02
Numb. helpful feedback -0.015 1.00014e-02 5.804e-03
Verified Purchase -0.285*** 1.019621e-05 6.468e-02
Has images or videos 0.613** 7.7998e-12 8.95e-02
Observations: 18,440 pseudo R2: 0.3953554
Table 1.3: Logit regression after correcting for endogenous classification errors.
1.4.4 Alternative database
As mentioned at the beginning of section 1.4, the database collected from
sellers who were either caught soliciting fake reviews or were flagged by users for
being involved in suspicious activity may suffer from selection bias. Indeed, by
focusing the analysis on those sellers, the resulting sample may end up with an
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overrepresentation of fake reviews, which could then affect the resulting estimates
from the Logit regressions. Moreover, restricting the analysis to those sellers may
limit the overall sample size, as manually finding suspicious sellers is a tedious and
time consuming process. And finally, the resulting dataset is highly heterogenous, as
it includes several different types of products, ranging from cheap electronic devices
to children’s toys, which can lead our model to be misspecified.
To address these issues, I collected a separate dataset comprised exclusively
of wireless headsets sold at Amazon, not targeting any seller from such category
in the sampling process. The reason I chose wireless headsets is because one can
find evidence in the news that fake reviews for these products are very prolific on
Amazon, thus making the analysis for this market economically relevant (see for
instance How merchants use Facebook to flood Amazon with fake reviews (April 23,
2018)). The dataset was then used to estimate a model similar to the one presented
in section 1.4.3.
The dataset is comprised of 278,829 reviews from 1,134 different headphone
products. So sellers on average received approximately 246 reviews, which is signif-
icantly higher than the average number of reviews from the previous sample. But
regarding the distribution of stars, they are very similar for both samples as depicted
by figure 1.19.
57
Figure 1.19: Histogram of the number of stars per sample. The bars in blue cor-
respond to the sample of wireless earphone products, while the one in orange cor-
responds to the sample described in section 1.4.1 generated by targeting suspicious
products that were either soliciting reviews in online platforms, or were flagged as
suspicious on Amazon forums.
1.4.4.1 Fake review detection
Because there is no prior evidence to suggest that a particular seller from
this new dataset solicited fake reviews, I no longer employ criterion number 1.4.1.1
presented in section 1.4.1.1 in the fake review detection process. Instead, I rely solely
criterion 1.4.1.1, i.e., I classify a review as fake if its text content is sufficiently similar
to some other review from the sample.8 Applying this unique classification rule to
the sample results in 37,921 of the total of 278,829 reviews being classified as fake,
8Moreover, the computational burden from criterion II*) increases, while its efficacy decreases
as the sample size increases, which is another reason not to use this criterion on the new dataset.
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which amounts to approximately 19% of reviews.
While this percentage may already seem alarmingly high, it greatly underes-
timates the actual proportion of fake reviews for this market. Indeed, just as an
illustration, consider a couple of products in the sample for which the Jaccard sim-
ilarity index accused less than 15% of their reviews from being fake. By inspecting
those two products more closely, one can find that: 1) more than 99% of their reviews
were 5 star and unverified purchase reviews, and 2) they were mostly concentrated
around a few days during the time period reviews were posted for these products,
as depicted in figure 1.20. So it is safe to assume that for these two products the
Jaccard similarity index alone was not capable to capture all suspicious activity.
For this reason we add in our Logit regression variables aimed at detecting potential
classification errors, such as adding dummies that assume value 1 when the review
was posted during a spike of positive reviews. The criteria for detecting those spikes
is explained in more detail on the appendix session A.0.3.2.
Now to see how the detection of fake reviews using Jaccard similarity com-
pares with other detection methods, I compute the average number of fake re-
views obtained through this method for each different grade category received on
Fakespot.com, a platform dedicated to detecting fraudulent reviews on online rating
platforms such as Amazon and Yelp. Figure 1.21 displays the average number of
fake reviews per product for each grade category, where “A” corresponds to the best
possible grade (i.e., to the lowest level of review manipulation) that a product can
get, and “F” corresponds to the worst grade possible. The plot depicts a negative
relationship between grades and the number of reviews detected as fake using the
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(a) µ0 = .2 (b) µ0 = .5
Figure 1.20: Number of 5 star reviews received by a couple of products per day.
Product 1 is no longer sold at Amazon, perhaps because Amazon detected suspicious
activity surrounding its reviews and thus had the product removed. Regarding
product 2, as I write this on May 16, 2019, though it is still sold on Amazon, all its
positive reviews (4 and 5 stars) have been removed.
Jaccard similarity index. If the relationship is not perfectly decreasing, that is prob-
ably due to the combination of two factors: 1) We are using a single criterion to
detect fake reviews, namely, the level of text similarity among the reviews, whereas
Fakespot seems to use a machine learning algorithm that computes the probability
of a review being fake using a combination of several different criteria; 2) Moreover,
Amazon has its own fake review detector, and it excludes fraudulent reviews from
its platform on a regular basis. This implies that on several occasions we would
encounter a product that engaged in a lot of suspicious activity, and yet had a high
score on Fakespot, solely because their fraudulent reviews were removed by Amazon
by the time we checked its grade. To mitigate the selection bias caused by hav-
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ing Amazon removing some of the suspicious reviews from the platform, for many
products in our sample we scraped their corresponding reviews at several different
days, so that our database contains many reviews that were filtered by Amazon, in
addition to reviews that were posted after Amazon’s filtering.




























Figure 1.21: Average number of fake reviews detected using text similarity, com-
pared to the product’s grade on Fakespot.com. According to the website, a grade
of “A” indicates low level of review manipulation, whereas a grade of “F” indicates
a high number of fraudulent reviews. The 95% confidence intervals displayed in the
figure were built using 100,000 bootstrap simulations.
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1.4.4.2 Logit Regressions
Table 1.4 reports the results from standard Logit regressions. The results
are mostly similar to the ones obtained before: for the fully specified model, the
coefficients of interest follow the right direction predicted by the theoretical model,
namely, that as times goes by, reviews are less likely to be fake; and that the
relationship between reputation and the probability of a review has a downward
parabola shape.
Also, once we add the dummy coefficient that assumes value 1 when the review
was posted during an abnormal peak of 5 stars, we see that reviews are more likely
to be classified as fake during those periods. That is not surprising given that in
our sample 45% of the reviews posted during abnormal peaks were classified as fake,
while only 17% of the reviews outside those peaks were classified as fake.
Moving to the model specification that addresses classification error, we get
coefficients similar to the ones obtained using the previous dataset, as displayed
in table 1.5. The only main difference between the two regressions are the signs
from the coefficients for reputation, which now display signs not consistent with the
inverted U shape relationship between reputation and effort on review manipulation.
















Dummy for text reliability −2.147∗∗∗
(0.013)
Dummy for title reliability −1.175∗∗∗
(0.017)




Has images or videos 0.166∗∗∗
(0.036)
Observations 232,176 232,176
Log Likelihood −88,368.930 −122,434.000
Akaike Inf. Crit. 176,757.900 244,876.100
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 1.4: Simple Logit regressions using the earphone dataset.
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variable estimates p-values std errors
x
constant 70.9*** 4.36e-20 7.72
µ̃i,s,t -2.49e+02*** 6.33e-19 28
µ̃2i,s,t 2.26e+02*** 5.52e-19 25.352
time -2.87e-03*** 2.40e-14 3.76e-04
z
constant 1.86*** 0.000 2.765e-02
peak dummy 0.523*** 0.000 1.867e-02
Dummy for text reliability -2.22*** 0.000 1.41e-02
Dummy for title reliability -1.24*** 0.000 1.824e-02
Numb. helpful feedback 2.29e-03*** 1.80e-10 3.596e-04
Verified Purchase -1.35*** 0.000 1.954e-02
has images or videos 0.16*** 1.29e-05 3.6724e-02
Observations: 232,176 pseudo R2: 0.2933641
Table 1.5: Logit regression after correcting for endogenous classification errors.
1.4.5 Placebo test
A placebo test was conducted in order to certify that the correlations obtained
in the previous sections were not spurious. To perform the test, we first randomly
classify reviews as fake or real according to the empirical distribution from the
sample. Since roughly 19% of the reviews in the sample were classified as fake, we
randomly choose a review to be assigned as fake with probability .19. Then we run
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the same regressions as before with this new random assignment.9 The results from
those regressions are displayed in tables 1.6 and 1.7, from which one can see that,
with the exception of intercepts, all coefficients are statistically insignificant.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper develops a theoretical model in which sellers dynamically choose
the effort spent on review manipulation. One of the predictions from the model is
that the effort spent on review manipulation tends to be concentrated during the
initial periods following a seller’s entrance (or reentrance with a new brandname)
into the market, since sellers wish to maximize the impact from each fake review.
Another prediction from the model is that the amount of effort dedicated in review
fraud does not vary monotonically with the firm’s reputation. Indeed, sellers that
currently possess a very good or very bad reputation will usually spend less effort
in review manipulation, the intuition being that, for very low levels of reputation,
the seller finds it too costly to signal that it is of high quality, whereas a seller that
has already accumulated a very good reputation does not need to prove that it is a
high quality type. In mathematical terms, very high or very low reputation levels
are absorbing states: the closer a seller is to those states, the harder it is to depart
from them, which in turn defeats the purpose of trying to influence signals generated
from reviews.
Another interesting prediction from the theoretical model is that low quality
9The variables “Reliability index from review title” and “Reliability index from review text”
were also recomputed based on the new assignment.
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Dependent variable:












Reliability index from review title −0.001∗∗
(0.0003)
Reliability index from review text −0.00002
(0.00002)
Numb. of words −0.0001
(0.0003)







Log Likelihood −125,382.700 −125,387.500
Akaike Inf. Crit. 250,787.400 250,782.900
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 1.6: Placebo Tests
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variable estimates p-values std errors
x
intercept 0.882 0.919 8.655
µ̃i,s,t 14.539 0.555 24.639
µ̃2i,s,t -11.553 0.494 16.908
time 0.093 0.422 0.116
z
intercept 1.204*** 0.000 0.020
peak dummy -0.013 0.449 0.018
Reliability index from review title -0.063 0.029 0.029
Reliability index from review text -0.002 0.218 0.002
Numb. helpful feedback -0.000 0.870 0.000
Verified Purchase -0.012 0.512 0.019
has images -0.016 0.560 0.028
has videos 0.052 0.674 0.125
Observations: 204,219 pseudo R2: 4.95e-05
Table 1.7: Placebo test for the Logit regression, correcting for classification error.
sellers do not necessarily exert more effort on the fabrication of fake reviews as
compared to high quality sellers. Indeed, which type spends most effort on review
manipulation depends on the current level of reputation held by the seller. For very
low levels of reputation, it is the high quality seller that spends most effort in review
manipulation, while the opposite holds for low levels of reputation.
While the benchmark version from the model predicts that in the long run
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buyers eventually learn the true type form the seller; by allowing sellers to exit and
reenter the market with a new name, we observe that low quality sellers tend to
resort to this tactic very frequently, thus preventing customers from learning the
true type from low quality sellers in the long run. So this result suggests that one
way of making reviews more informative in online platforms such as Amazon and
TripAdvisor, is by building obstacles that prevent sellers from anonymously selling
their products under different account names.
In order to verify some of the model’s predictions empirically, I collected data
from products for which sellers were soliciting fake reviews on Amazon. After classi-
fying the reviews posted on those products as fake or real, I then ran a Logit regres-
sion to estimate the probability of a review being fake as a function of the seller’s
outstanding level of reputation and the time it took for the review to be posted.
Consistent with the predictions from the theoretical model, I find that the probabil-
ity of a review being fake decreases with time, and it varies non-monotonically with
the seller’s reputation, where very high or very low reputation levels are associated
with a lower probability of the review being fake.
These results have potential practical applications when it comes to fake re-
view detection. Indeed, the performance from machine learning algorithms can
potentially be improved with the inclusion of a measure of sellers’ reputation as
well as the time it took for the review to be posted since the seller entered into the
market, as predictor variables. In research currently underway, I plan to compare
the prediction power form neural network algorithms that include and exclude these
variables as predictors.
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Chapter 2: Opinion Polarization in the presence of noisy and biased
channels
Polarized opinions are often observed on topics that have objective truths.
Such polarization should not occur if the information available to the public is
perfectly reliable, or if everyone obtains information through the same channels. I
develop a dynamic model in which rational Bayesian updaters select among different
news channels in hopes of learning the truth about a certain state of the world. The
signals generated from news channels are not perfectly accurate (i.e., the news can
be imprecise or slanted), and those who read the news take that into account when
updating their beliefs regarding the topic in question. A novel feature from my
model is that it allows agents to develop different opinions regarding the reliability
of each news channel. Although agents initially start with the same priors regarding
the relevant state of the world and the quality of the news channels, their posterior
beliefs may diverge, as they gather information from different outlets. Preliminary
evidence seems to suggest that an increase in the level of bias from news channels
can actually help customers distinguish the direction of bias from each channel, thus




In the last years, many countries have observed a surge in polarized political
opinions. Many attribute that to an increase in the dissemination of false informa-
tion perpetrated by malicious agents, which are intensified by social media platforms
such as Facebook and Twitter, which, some would argue, create an echo chamber
environment in which agents cherry pick posts that are likely to confirm their prior
beliefs.
But if agents are utility maximizers and they learn from their mistakes, then
why should they systematically pick information from unreliable channels?1 This
paper aims to model the process that leads to such behavior. The model assumes
agents to be rational Bayesian updaters who wish to seek the truth about a certain
state of the world in order to take some action that directly affect their utility. For
example, one may want to know the true financial health of a certain company in
order to decide whether or not to invest in it; or to know whether or not vaccinations
1Following the notation from the seminal paper Shannon (1948) which initiated the field of
Information Theory, I denote a news channel as any intermediate agent responsible for the trans-
mission of some original piece of information. So that includes not only TV news channels such
as Fox News and CNN, but also newspapers, blog channels or word of mouth. Perhaps because
the term “channel” is usually associated with TV channels, some economists prefer using the
term “news source”, which I avoid using here as the term “source” has a different connotation in
Information Theory.
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against measles disease cause autism, so as to decide whether or not to have their
kids vaccinated.
Our model is comprised of a discrete and finite set of news channels, with
accuracy that is unknown to customers. So upon reading news from a certain
channel, the agent not only updates his beliefs pertaining the fact reported, but
also his beliefs regarding the quality of the news channel. Different news channels
are assumed to be equally costly, so that the ultimate reason someone prefers to
watch, say, Fox News, over CNN, has nothing to do with the former being a cheaper
source of information than the latter, but rather, it is due to the viewer’s past
experience with each of those news channels.
Though the results from the model are quite preliminary, simulations seem
to suggest that, by keeping the overall level of precision from channels constant
while increasing their bias has little to no impact on the observed level of opinion
polarization. Surprisingly, increases in the level of bias from news channels can
actually improve customers ex ante utility.
2.2 Related literature
This paper is closely related to Nimark and Sudaresan (2018), which also
devise a theoretical framework in which agents dynamically acquire information
through noisy and biased channels in order to learn the truth about a certain state
of the world. However, in their framework agents are assumed to know ex ante
the exact level of bias and precision from each available news channel, so that the
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only reason they would pick poor and unreliable channels is because they cost less.
However in our modern age of information and technology, it is relatively easy to find
examples in which reliable information can be obtained at virtually zero monetary
cost. Indeed, on the internet one can find for free several credible news articles
and scientific papers that are only one click away from unreliable conspiracy theory
websites. So the assumption that the monetary costs of different news channels is
what drives polarization of beliefs may not apply to certain contexts.2
In fact, in many instances agents seem eager to get information from low qual-
ity channels because they overestimate the reliability from those channels, not just
because they are cheaper. As an example, when it comes to gathering information
as to whether vaccinations can cause autism or other diseases, publicly available
information (or misinformation) can be found supporting either state of the world.
So one of the main motivations of my model is to relax the assumption that more
reliable channels cost more, and instead, assume that agents try to pick the best
channels at their disposal, while at the same time allowing them to dynamically
learn the quality from those channels.
2Nimark and Sudaresan (2018) justify the assumption that information from more precise chan-
nels are more costly because they are more technical, and therefore harder to understand. They
even mention as an example that reading and understanding a scientific article from Nature con-
cerning global warming is arguably more costly than watching a heated and sensationalistic debate
on the television addressing the topic. However, in their model the signal provided by each news
channel is binary (e.g., high or low). And the cost from processing a binary signal should not
depend on its precision. So implicitly, they are assuming that more precise information are sold
at a higher price (i.e., the cost is generated from acquiring, not processing information).
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In a different framework, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) develop a static model
in which Bayesian updaters seek to learn the truth about a certain state of the
world through noisy channels; but now customers do not know the reliability of
each channel, leading them to update not only their beliefs regarding the state of
the world, but also on the reliability of the news channel that they picked. The model
also endogenizes the amount of slant coming from each channel: sellers may want
to bias the information they provide towards readers’ priors, so as to improve their
perception among the public. But due to its static nature and its focus on analyzing
the news providers’ incentives to slant information, it is not an ideal framework for
explaining how polarization on beliefs are generated.
Another set of related papers are Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), Xiang
and Sarvary (2007) and Yildirim, Gal-Or and Geylani (2013), which, like Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2006), mostly focus on the incentives from channels to slant the news
in order to attract a bigger audience. But different from Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2006), these papers make reduced form assumptions regarding agents’ utilities.
Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), for instance, make the reduced form assumption
that slanted news reduces one’s utility quadratically. Moreover, it assumes that,
for biased readers, the more distant one’s posterior belief is from her prior, the
lower is her ex post utility from having gathered information from that source. My
paper distances itself from this approach by assuming instead that all agents in the
economy are rational expected utility maximizers who wish to learn the true state of
the world in order to make an optimal binary decision, such as whether to invest in
a certain company, or whether to vaccinate their kids agains measles disease. This
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way, tendencies to flock toward information sources that confirms one’s priors will
arise naturally from rational Bayesian update, and not due to some ad hoc utility
function that penalizes posteriors that drift away from one’s prior.
Also, as mentioned above, these papers mostly focus their analysis on the news
providers’ incentives to slant information. While endogenizing the overall amount
of slanting in the system has the potential of enriching the model, it reduces its
tractability, and in some instances may even add undesirable distortions. Xiang
and Sarvary (2007) for instance recognize that one concern surrounding their speci-
fication is that they make the requirement that news channels that have best access
to information are the ones that disseminate most misinformation. That is because
they assume that, since those channels have gathered more information, they are
in a position of displaying only a small fraction of such information. So implicitly
they assume that news channels are not capable of lying: they can only omit cer-
tain truths and replace them with “alternative facts”, so that the more information
they gather, the more “truths” can be omitted in their broadcasts. As a result, it
becomes actually more costly to sell slanted news, as opposed to selling unbiased
information. While understanding the incentives that lead channels to become more
or less biased can have several useful policy applications, in my model I abstract
from those issues by treating news bias completely exogenous, and focus entirely on
the impact that those biases have on agents’ beliefs.
In a somewhat different branch of the literature, papers like Papanastasiou
(2017) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) focus on informational cas-
cades models, which address the process through which misinformation can be dis-
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seminated perpetually in a chain of information sharing. The main intuition from
such result lies in the fact that, if an information has been shared by a sufficiently
high number of individuals before reaching a new agent, then the agent will think
that the information was most likely already fact checked by at least someone else
that preceded the agent in the chain. If the information was false, then whoever
fact checked the news would not have passed it on; but since it was passed on, the
agent concludes that the information is most likely true. Because the agent assumes
the information to be true with high probability, he doesn’t bother to fact check it
before sharing it with the next person.
Building on this principle, Azzimonti and Fernandes (2018) write a model in
which agents dynamically share their beliefs in a social network. The network allows
one to add bots or other malicious agents to check the overall effect that they have
on opinion polarization. One drawback from their specification, however, is that the
connections on the network are completely exogenous. Moreover the model relies
on heuristic assumptions that forces agents to listen to information from biased
and potentially malicious channels, when unbiased channels are freely available. So
an interesting research project would be to adapt Azzimonti and Fernandes (2018)




An economy is comprised of N news channels and M agents, indexed by n and
m, respectively. News channels convey information about a certain company c. The
company has quality q ∈ {qH , qL}, where 1 ≥ qH > qL ≥ 0. Time is discrete and
infinite, and at each period t ∈ {1, 2, · · · } the company generates a random signal
yt ∈ {−1, 1}, where the probability yt = 1 is given by q ∈ {qH , qL} (because qH > qL,
this implies that a high quality company is more likely to generate a positive signal
at each period).
At each period, news channels can either report the realized signal accurately
or inaccurately, depending on their precision, which we shall define next. Following
Nimark and Sudaresan (2018), the precision from a channel n consists on a pair of
probabilities (pnH , p
n
L) ∈ [0, 1]2, where pnH is the probability that the news channel
reports a high signal when the actual signal is high, and pnL is the probability that
the news channel reports a low signal when the actual signal is low. As an example,
(pnH , p
n
L) = (1, 1) would be a perfectly precise channel (it always reports the true
signal), whereas any news channel such that pnH +p
n
L = 1 would be completely unin-
formative/imprecise, as it would report either signal with probability .5 regardless
the true quality of the company. The precision can also capture the level of bias
from a certain news channel. For instance, a channel with precision (pnH , p
n
L) = (1, 0)
would always report favorable news pertaining the company, so one could interpret
such channel as being biased towards praising the company (as it turns out, such
news channel is also completely uninformative, since it always praises the company
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no matter what the actual fact is).




n=1 as the vector of precision of the N channels, and
assume that the quality from the company, q, and vector of precision p from the
news channels are randomly drawn from the joint distribution fq,p(·). We denote
fq(·) and fp(·) as the marginal density of q and p, respectively. The quality from the
company, q, and precision from the news channels, p, remain constant throughout
the game, and they are both unknown to customers. Customers wish to learn the
true type of the company in order to make an optimal investment decision in every
period. If the company is of high quality and the consumer invests in the company
in period t, he gets a payoff of 1 in that period, while his payoff from not investing
is zero; but if the company is of low quality, then the agent gets a payoff of 0 from
investing, and 1 from not investing. So the agent essentially gets a payoff of 1 when
he makes the right decision, which is to invest when the company is of high quality,
and not invest, when the company is of low quality; and a payoff of 0 when he
makes the wrong decision, which is to invest when the company is of low quality,
and not invest, when the company is of high quality. So if at a certain period an
agent believes the firm to be of high quality with probability Prob(q = qH) ≥ .5,
then he should invest in the company in that period, thus resulting in an expected
payoff of Prob(q = qH) for that period, whereas if Prob(q = qH) < .5, the agent
should not invest, resulting in an expected payoff of 1− Prob(q = qH).3
3Though we framed the model in terms of investment decisions, it might also have applications
in other areas, such as understanding the opinion formation of political candidates, or topics that
have objective truths, such as whether or not global warming is manmade.
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At each period t an agent can either pick a news from one of the n channels
at a cost C > 0, or pick no news at all. We assume that the cost C is the same for
every news channel, regardless of their precision. This assumption diverges from the
method utilized by Nimark and Sudaresan (2018), where they assume that the cost
of processing information from a channel is proportional to the channel capacity.
We depart from that assumption because, though Shannon (1948) has proven that
the maximum rate at which one can learn an unobserved signal through a noisy
channel is bounded above by the channel’s capacity, in our model agents can only
pick a single observation from a channel in each period, and the cost from processing
a binary datapoint (1 bit) should not depend on its precision. The only reason one
would use channel capacity to measure the cost of processing a binary datapoint is if
one believes that the market equilibrates to the point that more reliable information
are sold at a higher price. But one can find anecdotal evidence in which that is not
always the case, in fact, many channels with different degrees of reliability are freely
available on the internet.
In the event the agent picks a news from channel n, he updates his beliefs
regarding q and the distribution of the precision (pnH , p
n
L) from that news channel
conditional on q, through Bayes’ rule. In the event the agent does not read any
news at time t, he does not make any updates.
After updating their beliefs, agents make their investment decision. As de-
scribed earlier, if their updated beliefs on the firm’s quality are such that Prob(q =
qH) ≥ .5, then they should invest in that period, thus resulting in an expected payoff
of Prob(q = qH) for that period, whereas if Prob(q = qH) < .5, then they should
78
not invest, resulting in an expected payoff of 1− Prob(q = qH).
So to summarize, the timeline of the model goes as follows: 1) at the beginning
of each period agents pick a signal from one of the news channels (or no signal); 2)
after they choose a news channel and observe the signal, they update their beliefs
pertaining the quality of the company, and the precision from the news channel that
they picked; 3) after that, they make an investment decision (invest, or not invest);
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Figure 4: Long run polarization of q when C = .001 as a function of p, agents can not
fact check a news, and the discount factor   equals .5, assuming all agents start with the
same uninformative priors, and one of the news channel has high precision (1, p), while
the other has low precision (p, 1).
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Figure 2.1: Schematics for the timeline of the model, where f tq(·) represents the
beliefs that the agent has a the be inning of period t regarding the quality of the
company; and (fn,tp (·|q))Nn=1, the beliefs that the agent has t th beginning of period
t on the precision from each channel, conditional on the quality of the company.
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Assuming agents have a discount factor β ∈ [0, 1), we have that their dynamic
problem is a solution to the following Bellman equation




Et(U t+1n )− CIn6=0(n) + βEt[V (f t+1q , fp(·|q))], (2.1)
where the state variables are f tq(·), the beliefs the agent has at the beginning of
period t regarding the quality of the company; and f tp(·|q), the beliefs the agent has
at the beginning of period t on the precision from each news channel, conditional
on the quality of the company. The choices available to each player in every period
consists on the set of channels the agent can choose, n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, plus the
option of n = 0, which corresponds to the action of not picking any channel. The
term
U t+1n = max{(f t+1q (qH), 1− f t+1q (qH)} (2.2)
is the expected utility of making the optimal investment decision in period t, after
the agent has learned the signal from channel n and updated f tq(·) through Bayes’
rule. Notice that we take an expectation on U t+1n , since the agent’s beliefs regarding
the quality of the company, f t+1q (·), might change depending on the news the agent
receives in that period. Moreover, the cost C is only paid in the event the person




1, if n 6= 0
0, if n = 0
We now proceed to explain in detail how agents update their beliefs upon
receiving a news, i.e., how to update f tq and f
n,t




Recall from the previous section that we are assuming the company’s quality
q to be a binary random variable (q ∈ {qH , qL}). We will also assume that the
channels’ precision p are discrete random variables as well. For the case in which
these random variables are continuous, one only needs to replace the summations
from the formulas below by integrals.
So suppose an agent starts a period with belief f tq(·) regarding the quality from
the company in question, and conditional belief f tp(·|q) on news channels’ precision.
Then the prior joint distribution of the company’s quality q and channels’ precision
p is given by





So upon reading a news ŷ ∈ {−1, 1} from channel n in period t, where ŷ = 1
represents a news that portrays the company favorably, and ŷ = −1 a news that
portrays the company unfavorably, we have that the updated joint distribution of q
and p is given by
f t+1q,p (q, p|ŷ) =
Prob(q ∩ p ∩ ŷ|f tq,p(q, p))
Prob(ŷ|f tq,p(q, p))
So if ŷ = 1, the updated joint distribution is given by
f t+1q,p (q, p) =
f tq,p(q, p)(qp
n







H + (1− q̃)(1− p̃nL))
,
whereas if ŷ = −1, the the updated joint distribution is given by
f t+1q,p (q, p) =





q,p(q̃, p̃)(q̃(1− p̃nH) + (1− q̃)p̃nL)
,
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Once the updated joint distribution is computed, one can recover the marginal
distribution of q:
f t+1c (q) =
∑
p̃
f t+1q,p̃ (q, p̃),
which is then used to compute Prob(q = qH) from expression 2.2.
We can also recover the distribution of p conditional on q by computing:
f t+1p (p|q) =
f t+1q,p (q, p)
f t+1c (q)
.
After observing an event that happens with zero probability, the agent’s pos-
terior can take any form. So for example, if Prob(ŷ|f tq,p(q, p)) = 0, then we can
assume without loss of generality that f t+1q,p (q, p|ŷ) = .5.
2.4 Existence and uniqueness of a solution to the Bellman equation
Proposition 2.4.1 There exists a unique V (·, ·) that is a solution to the Bellman
equation 2.1.
Proof: Let C(X) be the set of real bounded continuous functions with the
sup norm defined over the set of possible probability mass functions for q and p
conditional on q. If V ∈ C(X), then clearly the function
T (V ) = max
n∈{0,1,2,··· ,N}
Et(U t+1n )− CIn6=0(n) + βEt[V (f t+1q , fp(·|q))] (2.3)
also belongs to C(X). Indeed,
Et(U t+1n ) =
∑
ŷ
Prob(ŷ|f tq,p(q, p)) max{(f t+1q (qH |ŷ), 1− f t+1q (qH |ŷ)}
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is clearly continuous and bounded (above by 1 and below by 0). So for every
n ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , N}, the expression
Et(U t+1n )− CIn6=0(n) + βEt[V (f t+1q , fp(·|q))]
is bounded and continuous since it is a convex combination of bounded and con-
tinuous functions. Because the maximum of a finite set of bounded and continuous
function is also bounded and continuous, we have that T (V ) is bounded and con-
tinuous.
Now the operator T : C(X) → C(X) clearly satisfies the Blackwell sufficient
conditions for a β-contraction. Because C(X) is a Banach space, this implies that
the operator T (·) has a unique fixed point in C(X), by the contraction mapping
theorem.
2.5 Simulations
Figure 2.2 provides Esteban and Ray (1994) measure of polarization for dif-
ferent levels of news bias, when there are only 2 news channels available, and where
q and p can each assume only 2 possible distinct values (if q and p had a bigger
support, the number of state variables from the functional equation 2.1 would be
larger, thus triggering curse of dimensionality issues).
Figure 2.3 displays the ex ante utility that agents get as a function of media
bias, when the game lasts for only 5 periods (computations for an infinite version
of the model exhibits the same pattern) which is essentially the value function from
the first period evaluate at agents’ prior beliefs. As displayed in the figure, agents’
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Figure 2.2: Long run polarization of q when C = .001 as a function of ρ, where one
of the news channel has high precision (1, ρ), while the other has low precision (ρ, 1),
and agents are not allowed to fact check the news. The discount factor β equals .5,
and all agents start with the same uninformative priors.
expected utility actually increase with media bias, probably due to the fact that,
with an increase in bias, agents can more easily discern the direction of channel bias,
thus simplifying their decision making process.
2.6 Allowing agents to fact check the news
In the model described in section 2.3, agents had no control over the quality
of information they received from each channel. But in practice one might expect
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Figure 2.3: Long run polarization of q when C = .001 as a function of ρ, where
one of the news channel has high precision (.6− ρ, .6 + ρ), while the other has low
precision (.6 + ρ, .6 − ρ), and agents are not allowed to fact check the news. The
discount factor β equals .5, and all agents start with the same uninformative priors,
and the game is played for 5 periods.
agents to have the ability to collect more reliable information by exerting a higher
effort on their search for knowledge. Indeed, upon reading a certain news article
that discusses the financial health of a corporation, the reader might be able to
check the reliability of the information provided in the article by comparing it with
other sources of information, including raw data on the firm’s stock value, or data
collected from the firm’s annual report.
So now we will assume that, upon reading a news, agents can pay an additional
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cost to fact check the signal provided. More precisely, after receiving a signal ŷ,
readers can pay an additional cost K to learn the true signal y generated by the
company at that time period. Paying that additional cost would help agents to
learn the precision of the channels and quality of the company at a faster rate.
Adding this fact checking mechanism still does not contribute to generating a
pattern of the effect of bias on polarization. So this is a topic that deserves future
study.
2.7 Conclusion
Preliminary evidence seems to suggest that an increase in the level of bias from
news channels can actually help customers distinguish the direction of bias from each
channel, thus improving their ex ante utility. The seemingly no effect that bias has
on polarization is concerning, and probably requires some model modifications. I
believe changing the fact checking mechanism by making it more similar to Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2006), would probably solve the issue. More precisely, instead of
assuming that agents pay a fixed cost to fact check the news they just received, at
the end of each period some agents randomly receive the information as to whether
the news they read is fake or real.
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Chapter 3: An Improved Bound to Manipulation in Large Stable
Matches
This paper derives an upper bound to the expected proportion of agents that
have incentives to misreport their true preferences or vacancies in many-to-one stable
matching mechanisms. The paper shows that the upper bound converges to zero
as the number of participants in the market goes to infinity at a faster rate as
compared to previous results in the literature. Moreover, the paper relaxes some
of the assumptions that are typically made in order to get this type of result. In
particular, it relaxes a requirement that would cause the market to end up with
many unfilled positions, thus causing the convergence result to be applicable to
more competitive environments. So this paper adds evidence to the fact that, though
stable matching mechanisms are not entirely strategy-proof, in practice, when the
number of participants in the market is sufficiently large, they can be treated as
being effectively strategy-proof.
3.1 Introduction
Centralized two sided matching mechanisms have been widely used in the US
and abroad to allocate scarce resources in situations where market based solutions
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(such as auctions) are not ideal or can be perceived as unfair. Examples include
the college admission problem and matching programs for medical residency (Roth
and Stomayor (1992)). Ideally, a matching mechanism should satisfy some set of
desirable properties. One such property is stability. A matching mechanism is said
to be stable if it is individually rational (i.e., agents weekly prefer the match they
get under the mechanism over staying unmatched) and if every pair of agents prefers
the match they get under the mechanism over being matched to one another. One of
the benefits of a matching mechanism being stable is that it gives agents incentives
to follow through the recommendation made by the matchmaker, not to mention
that it causes agents to perceive the resulting allocation as fair.1
It is a well known result, however, that a stable matching mechanism can
not be strategy-proof for both sides of the market. In other words, in a stable
matching mechanism, there always exist a set of preferences such that revealing
one’s true preferences and vacancies is not a dominant strategy for at least one side
of the market. The lack of strategy-proofness can affect a mechanism’s efficacy.
Indeed, in the context of the college admission problem, if truthful reporting is
not a dominant strategy, students or colleges can end up waisting too much effort
acquiring information on other agents’ preferences and vacancies before making their
1Making sure that a mechanism is fair is particularly important when it comes to matching
design given that one of the motivations for implementing a matching mechanism in the first place
as opposed to market based solutions such as an auction, is because market based solutions tend to
be perceived as unfair in certain contexts (e.g., it would be unfair if only the rich kids got allocated
to the top schools).
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optimal decisions. Moreover, if agents misreport their preferences or vacancies, then
the resulting allocation may not be stable with respect to the true preferences and
vacancies, which can then lead some agents to either sue the matchmaker under
the basis that the resulting allocation is unfair, or ignore its recommendation. And
finally, colleges may wish to underreport their number of vacancies in order to attract
better students, which can then lead to an overall shortage of vacancies offered by
colleges.
Though this impossibility result may cause concerns surrounding the imple-
mentation of stable matching mechanisms, simulation exercises have suggested that
in practice the proportion of agents that can successfully manipulate stable match-
ing mechanisms is relatively small, and the differences in allocations obtained by
implementing different stable matching mechanisms also tends to be negligible (see
Roth and Peranson (1999)). Those simulations have led authors to conjecture that,
as long as a market has a sufficiently high number of participants (i.e., as long as
it is sufficiently thick),2 and as long as the number of acceptable choices from each
agent on at least one side of the market is bounded, then the proportion of agents
in the market that can benefit by misreporting their preferences or vacancies should
be small.
Some authors have proven this conjecture analytically: Immorlica and Mah-
dian (2005) for one-to-one matchings (i.e., for the marriage market) and then Kojima
2In this paper, a market being thick loosely means that it has a large number of participants. It
should not be confused with the connotation that the term has in Kojima and Pathak (2009), where
it is used to designate a formal technical assumption regarding the distribution of preferences.
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and Pathak (2009) who extended Immorlica and Mahdian (2005) results to many-
to-one matchings (i.e., to the college admission problem), though focusing on a very
specific type of stable mechanism: the student optimal stable match mechanism
(SOSM). However, as Kadam (n.d.) observed, in some very conservative environ-
ments, Kojima and Pathak (2009) results require an absurdly large number of par-
ticipants in the market to guarantee that the mechanism is effectively strategy-proof,
sometimes more than 10600 participants.3 In a survey, Pathak (2011) recognizes that
it is still an open question as to whether a tighter upper bound to these convergence
results can be found.
More recently, Storms (2013) has made a considerable improvement on Kojima
and Pathak (2009) upper bound, by showing that one can focus on a very specific
type of strategy in order to determine whether a college has incentives to misreport
its preferences or vacancies. He also extended Kojima and Pathak (2009) results to
all other stable matching mechanisms. Though Storm’s improvement on the rate of
convergence is significant, it is still arguably slow, which can lead one to question
whether those results have practical applications to existing markets.4
A common feature shared by all of the aforementioned papers is that they
derive their main convergence results by applying the same logic: first they show
3As I write this in 2018, the current estimated number of atoms in the universe ranges between
1078 and 1082.
4Apart from the papers cited above, more recently Azevedo and Budish (2019) provided a
different approach to show that certain mechanisms, including deferred acceptance mechanisms,
are effectively strategy-proof for large markets. Their convergence rate to the equilibrium, however,
is even slower, as their result is proven for a more generic set of mechanisms, including auctions.
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that the only reason why a college would want to misreport its preferences in the
SOSM mechanism is because, by rejecting an acceptable student, that student can
potentially make a proposal to her next best college, which in turn can accept the
offer, and as a result, displace a less preferred student for which it was already
tentatively matched with. The displaced student can then make an offer to her
next best choice, thus perpetuating a chain of new offers and rejections that can
potentially lead to a new proposal being made to the college that started this chain
reaction. Those papers then proceed to show that for large markets such chain is
likely to be disrupted due to a new offer being made to a college with open vacancies
before a new offer is ever made to the college that triggered the chain of rejections.
So their results rely on assumptions that guarantee that the market ends up with
many unfilled seats after implementing the SOSM mechanism (one way to achieve
this is by assuming that the market has more vacancies than students).
In this paper I modify this approach by showing instead that those chains of
rejections are more likely to come to a halt as the result of a student in the chain
having exhausted all of his acceptable choices. For this reason, the results presented
in this paper do not rely on the market having disproportionally more vacancies than
students. This is particularly important given that many matching markets are so
competitive that virtually all vacancies end up being filled, such as the Brazilian
centralized college admission market.5 The rate of convergence for truth telling
that I get is also significantly faster than the ones obtained in the aforementioned
5Because public Brazilian universities are completely tuition free, there is a fierce competition
for getting into those universities, resulting in virtually all vacancies being filled.
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literature.
3.2 General framework for the college admission problem
This section describes the main environment and introduces some basic nota-
tion. Much of the notation and definitions (such as stability and SOSM) are standard
in the Matching literature, and therefore can be skipped by someone already familiar
with those concepts.
A market is comprised of two disjoint sets of participants: a set C = {c1, c2, · · · , cm}
of m colleges and a set S = {s1, s2, · · · , sn} of n students. Each college c is assumed
to have a limited number of vacancies given by qc ∈ N. Each student can either be
matched with a single college or stay unmatched, and each college c can either be
matched with a subset of students not exceeding its capacity qc, or stay unmatched.
Each student s has a list of strict rational preferences over C and ∅, denoted by
s, and each college c has a list of strict rational preferences over the 2|S| set of
subsets of students plus the empty set ∅, denoted by c. If ∅ s c, then student s
is said to prefer being unmatched over being matched to college c, or that college
c is unacceptable to student s. If ∅ c S̃ then college c is said to prefer being
unmatched over being matched with the subset of students S̃, or that the subset of
students S̃ is unacceptable to college c. Because a college c will only be allowed to
be matched with at most qc students, it is assumed without loss of generality that a
college prefers to remain unmatched over being matched with any group of students
exceeding its capacity, i.e., ∅ c S̃ for all S̃ such that |S̃| > qc. A market is then a
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tuple (S,C,S,C , q), where S= (s)s∈S, C= (c)c∈C and q = (qc)c∈C .
For a given preference relation c from college c, define Rc as the preference
relation over individual students derived from c, i.e., Rc is a preference relation
defined on S ∪ ∅ such that sRcs′ if and only if {s} c {s′} for all s, s′ ∈ S ∪ ∅.
Definition 3.2.1 College c’s preferences c are responsive if sRcs′ implies that for
any S̃ ⊆ S with s ∈ S̃ and s′ /∈ S̃ implies that S̃ c S̃ ∪ {s′}\{s}.
Informally, colleges having responsive preferences simply means that they rank stu-
dents regardless of the set of other students that they are already matched with.
Throughout this paper all colleges are assumed to have responsive preferences. This
assumption is commonly made in the matching literature for tractability reasons. In
particular, when preferences exhibit complementarities, a stable matching allocation
may not even exist (Roth and Stomayor (1992)).6
Throughout the analysis, only preferences over individual students, Rc, will
be required, not c. For this reason, sometimes C will be replaced by RC in a
market’s description, likewise (S,C,S, RC , q), where RC = (Rc)c∈C corresponds to
colleges’ preferences over individual students.
Assume that each student only has k ≤ m acceptable choices, and that all
students are acceptable to all colleges. While the hypothesis that all students are
acceptable to all colleges is without loss of generality, the convergence results derived
in this paper require that at least one side of the market has a limited number of
acceptable choices. This assumption was also required in previous literature (namely,
6Though Storms (2013) is able to prove his results for a class of preferences that is a superset
of responsive preferences, I abstract from such generalization in this paper.
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in Immorlica and Mahdian (2005), Kojima and Pathak (2009) and Storms (2013)),
the reason being that for stable matching mechanisms in which the number of agents
on each side of the market (in the current context, the number of students vs the
number of vacancies) are approximately equal to one another, and in which every
agent prefers any match over staying unmatched (i.e., all matches are acceptable)
then it can be shown that the market has a high proportion of individuals that can
potentially benefit by misreporting their preferences, even in large markets (Ashlagi,
Kanoria and Leshno (2015)).
Though the assumption that agents have a limited set of acceptable choices
may seem restrictive, it can be justified by the empirical evidence that in most real
world centralized matching markets agents not allowed to elicit more than a fixed
number of acceptable choices. So the results derived in this paper provide a good
approximation to matching mechanisms in which this constraint is not believed to
be binding for most participants.
Definition 3.2.2 In market (S,C,S,C , q), a matching µ is a correspondence
mapping C ∪ S into itself, possibly assuming empty values, such that:
1. ∀c ∈ C, µ(c) ⊆ S (possibly, with µ(c) = ∅), and |µ(c)| ≤ qc.
2. ∀s ∈ S, µ(s) ⊆ C (possibly, with µ(s) = ∅), and |µ(s)| ≤ 1.
3. ∀c ∈ C and s ∈ S, s ∈ µ(c) if and only if µ(s) = c.
In words, a matching is correspondence that maps students to colleges. Con-
dition 1 from definition 3.2.2 means that a college c is either matched to a subset of
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students which does not exceed its capacity qc, or is unmatched, in which case it is
said that college c is matched with itself (when µ(c) = ∅). Condition 2 means that
a student is either matched to a single college or is unmatched (when µ(s) = ∅).
And condition 3 means that a college c is matched with a subset of students that
includes student s if and only if student s is matched with college c.
Let j be the weak preference relation associated with j. An individual
j ∈ C ∪ S is said to weakly prefer the matching µ over the matching µ′ if and only
if µ(j) j µ′(j), and with abuse of notation that is denoted by µ j µ′.
For a given market (S,C,S,C , q), a matching µ is said to be individually
rational to agent j ∈ C ∪ S if µ(j) j ∅. For this same market, a college-student
pair (c, s) is said to block the matching allocation µ if c s µ(s) and sRcs′ for
some s′ ∈ µ(c).
Definition 3.2.3 For a given market (S,C,S,C , q), a matching µ is stable if:
1. µ is individually rational to all agents in the market,
2. There is no college-student pair that blocks µ.
It can be shown that when preferences from colleges are responsive, µ is stable
if and only if it is a core allocation, i.e., if and only if there is no coalition involving
any number of participants that can block µ (Roth and Stomayor (1992)).
In the current environment with a finite number of agents, one can always find
a stable matching by adopting the well known Gale and Shapley deferred acceptance
algorithm with students proposing. The algorithm works as follows:
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Algorithm 3 (Student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm)
Round 1) In the first round, each student applies to her most preferred college. Then each
college c accepts its preferred students among the ones making a proposal, and
rejects all other students in excess of its capacity qc. Students who are accepted
by a college are tentatively matched with that college.
Round k) At every subsequent step, students who are not currently tentatively matched
propose to their most preferred college among the ones they consider acceptable
and have not rejected them yet, and each college c accepts its preferred students
among the ones currently making a proposal and the ones they were tentatively
matched with in the previous round. Students in excess of the college’s capacity
are rejected.
The algorithm continues until each student is either tentatively matched with
an acceptable college or has already been rejected by all of their acceptable colleges.
The algorithm must eventually stop, as no student proposes to the same college
more than once, and because there is a finite number of students and colleges in the
market. As stated earlier, the resulting allocation obtained through this algorithm
is stable (Roth and Stomayor (1992)).
In a centralized matching mechanism, students and colleges report their pref-
erences and number of vacancies to a matchmaker, and based on those reports
the matchmaker determines the final matching outcome µ. Formally, in market
(S,C,S, RC , q), a matching mechanism is defined as a function ψ that maps stu-
dents’ reported preferences over colleges ′S, colleges’ reported preferences over in-
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dividual students R′C , and colleges’ reported number of vacancies q
′ into a matching
allocation ψ(′S, R′C , q′). Notice, that according to this definition, colleges report
their preferences only over individual students as opposed to reporting their com-
plete preferences over all the possible subsets of students that they can get matched
with. This is done because when colleges’ preferences are responsive their preferences
over individual students are enough to characterize whether a matching mechanism
is stable or not (Roth and Stomayor (1992)).
Denote ψ(′S, R′C , q′)(i) as the matching allocation obtained by agent i ∈ C ∪
S in mechanism ψ, when reported preferences and vacancies are {′S, R′C , q′}. A
matching mechanism is said to be stable if the resulting matching allocation is
stable with respect to agents’ reports.
Definition 3.2.4 In market (S,C,S, RC , q), a matching mechanism ψ is stable
if, given any report (′S, P ′C , q′), the resulting matching allocation ψ(′S, R′C , q′) is
stable in market (S,C,′S, R′C , q′).
One particular stable matching mechanism that has become increasingly pop-
ular in the school choice problem is the one that implements the Gale and Shapley
algorithm with students proposing (i.e., the one in which agents elicit their prefer-
ences and vacancies to the matchmaker, who then implements the Gale and Shapley
algorithm over those reports to determine the final allocation).
A desirable property of this mechanism is that it is stable with respect to
agents’ reported preferences and number of vacancies. As mentioned earlier, one of
the reasons stability is desirable is because it implies that agents have incentives to
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follow through the recommendation made by the matchmaker, assuming of course
that they have reported their preferences and vacancies truthfully. Associated with
stability is also the notion of fairness, as in a stable match a student indexed by
s will not envy the allocation from another student who ended up in a college for
which student s had a higher priority. For this reason, in the context of school
choice, the stability property is sometimes referred to as justified envy free property
(Abdulkadiroglu and Snmez (2003)).
Another desirable property of the Gale and Shapley mechanism is that, among
all the stable matchings, this is the one that provides the highest utility to students,
i.e., from the students’ perspective, this matching mechanism weakly Pareto domi-
nates all other stable matches (Roth and Stomayor (1992)). This is also the reason
why the allocation obtained through this mechanism is referred in the literature as
the student optimal stable match, or SOSM for short.
Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, it can be shown that this mechanism
is strategy-proof for students, that is, students have a weakly dominant strategy of
reporting their true preferences to the matchmaker (Roth and Stomayor (1992)).
Therefore, in this mechanism students do not need to think strategically when elic-
iting their preferences, thus greatly simplifying their decision making process.
In this mechanism, however, some colleges may potentially have incentives to
misreport their true preferences or to underreport their true number of vacancies.
One way of eliminating colleges’ incentives to misreport their preferences would be
by adopting the college proposing version of the Gale and Shapley algorithm, which
yields the most desirable stable match for colleges. However, in such an environment
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it would then be the students the ones willing to misreport their preferences, and
some colleges would still have incentives to underreport their vacancies (Sönmez
(1997)). As it turns out, it is impossible to find a stable mechanism in which those
incentives completely disappear, as explained in the next section.
3.3 Strategic Manipulation
An agent is said to be able to manipulate a matching mechanism ψ if, by
reporting preferences or vacancies other than their true preferences or vacancies,
the agent gets a better match, assuming that everyone else reports their preferences
and vacancies truthfully. Formally, incentives to manipulate a matching mechanism
can be stated as follows:
Definition 3.3.1 For a given market (S,C,S,C , q), a college c is said to be able




ψ(S, (R′c, R−c), (q′c, q−c))(c) c ψ(S, RC , q)(c).
Analogously, a student s is said to be able to manipulate a matching mechanism ψ
if there exists a preference list ′s such that
ψ((′s,−s), RC , q)(s) s ψ(S, RC , q)(s).
Even though students can not manipulate the SOSM mechanism, colleges may
potentially have incentives to either misreport their true preferences or to underre-
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port their number of vacancies.7 And for any stable match, there always exists a set
of preferences such that one or more agents in one side of the market can manipulate
the mechanism (Roth and Stomayor (1992)).
Notice that the form of strategic manipulation defined above does not include
prearranged matches, the practice of forming a match before the centralized match-
ing mechanism takes place. Section 3.4 provides a brief comment regarding this
specific type of manipulation. Unfortunately, unless agents have common knowl-
edge regarding the distribution of other agents’ preferences and vacancies, market
thickness may not be enough to eliminate the formation of those early matches.
The next section describes the main result from this paper, namely that though
strategic manipulation in stable matches is a theoretical possibility, under some
regularity conditions, a very small fraction of those agents can actually manipulate
a stable matching mechanism, provided that the market is sufficiently large.
3.4 Large Markets
The evaluation of the frequency with which agents can manipulate a matching
mechanism requires preferences to be random. So this section starts by describing
7Under the current environment where students’ preferences remain unaltered throughout the
entire matching process, it can be easily shown that colleges would never have strict incentives
to overreport their capacities, i.e., of undertaking a strategy resembling overbooking. In practice,
however, preferences may change throughout the matching process as a result of changes in home
addresses, changes in school location, inadequate provision of entitled services at assigned schools,
etc. But those frictions are not analyzed in this paper.
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the data generating process (DGP) governing agents’ preferences, and then it pro-
ceeds to show that, as the market becomes sufficiently large, the probability that a
generic agent can manipulate a stable matching mechanism converges to zero as the
number of participants in the market goes to infinity.
So starting with the description of the DGP governing agents’ preferences, it
is assumed that, associated with each college ci there is a number pci ∈ (0, 1), which
from now on shall be referred to as the popularity of college ci, and associated with
each student si there is a number psi ∈ (0, 1), the popularity of student si. Those
popularities are assumed to add up to one, i.e.,
∑m
i=1 pci = 1 and
∑n
i=1 psi = 1.
Without loss of generality agents are ordered from highest to lowest popularity, i.e.,
pc1 ≥ pc2 ≥ · · · ≥ pcm ,
and
ps1 ≥ ps2 ≥ · · · ≥ psn .
Given these popularities, the probability that the preference list from an arbitrary





and analogously, the probability that the preference list from an arbitrary student





where psi0 = pci0 = 0. That is, ordered sampling without replacement is used to
determine agents’ preferences.
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Notice that the greater the discrepancy between popularities, the more cor-
related the realized preferences become. For instance, if pci = (1 − ε)εi−1 and ε
is very small, then most students are likely to end up with the same preferences,
whereas pc1 = pc2 = · · · = pcm = 1/n would cause students’ preferences to become
completely uncorrelated with one another. Throughout this paper, no restrictions
whatsoever are imposed on colleges’ popularity, and therefore on the correlation
level of students’ preferences. But in terms of colleges’ preferences, it is assumed
that they are the least correlated as possible, that is:




Though this assumption may seem restrictive, it has been noticed that in
general more correlated preferences are associated with a lower number of agents in
the market being able to successfully manipulate a stable matching mechanism. In
particular, if all agents in one side of the market have the exact same preferences,
then no agent in the market will have incentives to misreport their preferences or
vacancies in any stable matching mechanism, which would make the convergence
result derived in this paper trivial. Though Ashlagi, Kanoria and Leshno (2015)
provide a counterexample in which more correlated preferences can actually increase
the level of manipulation in the market, cases like those are relatively rare, as shown
by his simulations and confirmed by our own simulations presented in section B.4 in
the appendix. Therefore, though a very specific DGP governing colleges’ preferences
is used, that is done entirely for tractability reasons (see the last paragraph from
section B.4 in the appendix), and the convergence of truth telling is expected to
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hold at an even faster rate for different DGP’s.
With that in mind, a stochastic market is defined as a tuple (S,C, PC , q),
where PC = {pc1 , pc2 , · · · , pcm} specifies the popularity of each college in the market.
Students’ popularity are omitted from the tuple, as they are always assumed to be
the same, i.e., ps = 1/|S| for all s ∈ S.
Given the above assumptions it can be shown that the expected proportion
of colleges that can manipulate any stable matching mechanism in this sequence of
random markets converges to zero as the number of colleges in the market goes to
infinity. Moreover, by adapting a proof presented by Storms (2013) one can show
that if in addition this sequence of random markets always has more students than
colleges, then the proportion of students that can manipulate any stable match also
converges to zero as the number of colleges goes to infinity.8 Those results are stated
formally in theorems 3.4.1 and 3.4.2.
Theorem 3.4.1 Let (Sm, Cm, PmC , q
m)m∈N be a sequence of stochastic markets such
that |Cm| = m and max({qm}) ≤ q for every m ∈ N, where q ∈ N. Also, denote
(mS , (Rm, qm))m∈N as the random sequence of preferences and vacancies associated
with this sequence of stochastic markets. For a given stable matching mechanism ψ,
α(m) =E
{
#c ∈ Cm;ψ(mS , (R̃c, Rm−c), (q̃c, qm−c)) mc ψ(mS , RmC , qm)
for some (R̃c, q̃c) and some stable match ψ
}
8In his proof, Storms (2013) forgets to mention that, in order to guarantee that the proportion
of students that can manipulate a stable match converges to zero, the sequence of random markets
must have at least as many students as colleges, which is usually the case in practical situations.
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corresponds to the expected number of colleges that can manipulate the mechanism.




























is an upper bound to the proportion of colleges that can manipulate a stable matching
mechanism, α(m)/m, and it converges to zero as m→∞.
The intuition for the proof can be described as follows. First, a result derived
by Storms (2013) (which is an improvement to one of the lemmas in Kojima and
Pathak (2009)) is used to narrow down the search of possible strategic manipulations
from colleges in the SOSM mechanism. Indeed, though in principle there are several
different ways a college can misreport its preferences (|Sm|! to be more precise),
one can focus on a single type of misrepresentation, which consists on a college
reporting all the students that it would ordinarily end up matched with in the SOSM
as unacceptable, while reporting its true preferences over the remaining students.
The intuition for why the analysis can be restricted to this very specific strategy is
because the only reason why a college would want to misreport its preferences in the
SOSM mechanism is to receive proposals from students who would ordinarily not do
so under truthful reporting. And those offers can be obtained by rejecting acceptable
students. Indeed, if a college rejects an acceptable student then that student will
propose to his next best option, which can potentially displace another student who
will then propose to his next best college, and so on, creating a chain of new proposals
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that can potentially reach back the college that triggered this chain reaction. So
intuitively, the more students a college rejects, the more likely the college will receive
a new offer. But because the deferred acceptance algorithm does not backtrack, the
only rejections that need to be considered are the ones that would not naturally
arise in the SOSM under truthful reporting, which consists on the rejection of the
students that a college ends up matched with under truthful reporting. Therefore a
necessary condition for a college to have incentives to manipulate the SOSM is that
the rejection of all the students it would ordinarily get matched with under truthful
reporting generates at least one new offer for that college. This is formally proven
in lemma B.2.2 in the appendix.
Then, it is shown that the probability that this type of strategy actually results
in a new offer being made to the college that triggers such chain of rejections is small
as the market size increases. While the previous literature has proven this result
by showing that for large markets such chain is likely to be disrupted due to a new
offer being made to a college with open vacancies before a new offer is ever made to
the college that triggered the chain of rejections; I shown instead that those chains
of rejections are likely to stop as the result of a student having exhausted all of
their acceptable choices. Proving the result through this method results in a faster
convergence rate, and it does not rely on assumptions that would cause the market
to have many unfilled seats.9
Because the SOSM is college pessimal, it can be shown that a necessary con-
9Kojima and Pathak (2009) and Storms (2013) impose the restriction that |Sm| ≤ qm for all
m ∈ N, which is not required in our derivation.
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dition for a college to have incentives to manipulate a stable matching mechanism is
that it can manipulate the SOSM mechanism, which implies that the upper bound
derived for colleges’ incentives to manipulate the SOSM also applies to any stable
match (lemma B.2.4).
Now moving to the results of the theorem, notice that the term inside the
brackets of the upper bound U(m) from theorem 3.4.1 always lies between zero and
one. However, because q ≥ 1, this upper bound can potentially be greater than one
for small sample sizes.
Figure 3.1 displays U(m) when every agent has the same popularity and when
each college has capacity q = 5 and each student has k = 5 acceptable colleges. As
illustrated in the figure, this function converges to zero much faster than previous
upper bounds derived in the literature.10














Figure 3.1: Upper bound U(m) compared with the upper bound derived by Storms
(2013), when q = k = 5.




For lower values of k or q, the upper bound naturally converges more quickly.
In particular, for q = 1, which corresponds to a one-to-one matching environment,
U(m) always lies between zero and one. But by inspecting the equation for U(m),
one can see that when k, the number of acceptable choices from each student, is
high, U(m) converges very slowly towards zero, even for low values of q. This
is illustrated in figure 3.2, which displays U(m) computed for different values of
k, where upper and lighter lines correspond to higher values of k. This pattern
is consistent with the theoretical prediction that incentives to manipulate stable
matching mechanisms are high when the market is balanced (i.e., when the number
of students is approximately equal to the number of vacancies) and all matches are
acceptable to both sides of the market.

















Figure 3.2: Upper bound U(m) for q = 1 and different values of k ranging from 5
to 15, where the upper and lighter lines correspond to higher values of k.
Using the result from theorem 3.4.1, one can also show as a corollary that,
provided that the market has more students than colleges (which is almost always
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true in practical situations) students also do not have incentives to misreport their
preferences in large stable matches. This result is formally stated in theorem 3.4.2.
Theorem 3.4.2 Consider the sequence of markets (Sm, Cm, PmC , q
m)m∈N described
in theorem 3.4.1. For a given stable matching mechanism ψ,
β(m) =E
{
#s ∈ Sm;ψ((̃s,m−s), RmC , qm) ms ψ(mS , RmC , qm)
for some ̃s and some stable match ψ} ,
corresponds to the expected number of students that can manipulate the mechanism.








→ 0, as m→∞, this implies that the proportion of students that can
manipulate a stable matching mechanism, β(m)|Sm| , also converges to zero, as m→∞.
Kojima and Pathak (2009) proves a corollary stating that the incentives to
form prearranged matches also goes to zero as the number of participants in the mar-
ket increases. The intuition from such corollary can be explained as follows. When
preferences are common knowledge, a college can only attract a student through
a prearranged match if the student’s ranking is strictly worse than all the other
students the college would naturally get matched with in the SOSM under truthful
reporting. So the only motivation for a college to pursue a prearranged match is to
improve its match in the centralized matching mechanism. So a necessary condition
for a college to be able to manipulate the mechanism through a prearranged match
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is that, if it does so, it receives a new offer in the centralized mechanism. Because
the probability that a college can receive a new offer by underreporting its vacancies
by one unit is only slightly lower than the probability that a college can get a new
offer in the centralized mechanism by forming a prearranged match, the convergence
result derived earlier also applies to this type of manipulation.
The practicality of this result is questionable, however, as it requires agents
to know in advance exactly what offers they would get in the centralized matching
mechanism, when in practice the main reason why agents agree to form prearranged
matches is because they are uncertain about the offers they might get (if any) in
the centralized market.11
3.5 Equilibrium Analysis
Our previous results show that the proportion of colleges and students that
does not have incentives to misreport their preferences or vacancies in a stable
matching mechanism converges to zero as the number of colleges in the market goes
to infinity, assuming that all other agents report their preferences truthfully. Though
this result already gives us an insight as to how agents will behave in practice (i.e.,
11While incentives to manipulate a mechanism through reported preferences or vacancies tend
to be the lowest in the presence of perfect information, when it comes to manipulation through
prearranged matches, it is the lack of knowledge of what will transpire in the centralized mechanism
that usually induces agents to seek an early match. Sönmez (1999) has shown that even in the
presence of full information, it is impossible for a stable matching mechanism to be both stable
and not manipulable through prearranged matches.
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they will probably just report their true preferences and vacancies), it still allows
for the theoretical possibility that a few agents may want to manipulate a stable
matching mechanism, even in large markets. Moreover, if those few agents were to
misreport their preferences, that could cause a chain reaction that would lead more
agents to misreport their preferences or vacancies. In this section we show that,
with the addition of a technical assumption (namely, assumption 3.5.2), it can be
shown that, when the number of participants in the market is sufficiently large, all
agents have incentives to report their preferences truthfully.
Because colleges’ preferences over students are assumed to be responsive, there
exists an additive utility function that represents these preferences. More precisely,
there exists an utility function uc(·) for college c defined over 2S, the set of all





s∈S′ uc(s), if |S ′| ≤ qc
< 0, else
,
where uc(s) > 0 ∀s ∈ S, uc(s) = uc({s}), and uc(s) > uc(s̃) if and only if sRcs̃.
Analogously, we can define a utility function function us(·) to each student s,
such that us(c) > us(c
′) if and only if c s c′, and us(c) < 0 if and only if college c
is unacceptable to student s.
For our sequence of random markets, we assume that uc(·) and us(·) are both
bounded, i.e., there exists a w ∈ R such that supuc(s) < w and supus(c) < w,
where each supremum is taken over colleges, students, and the size of the market,
m.
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Assumption 3.5.1 Let (Sm, Cm, PmC , q
m)m∈N be a sequence of stochastic markets
such that |Cm| = m, and {umc }mc=1 and {ums }ms=1 are agents’ realized utility functions.
We assume that utility functions are bounded, i.e., there exists a w ∈ R such that
supumc (s) < w and supu
m
s (c) < w for all s ∈ Sm and all c ∈ Cm and all m ∈ N.
Assumption 3.5.1 is required to ensure that the potential gains from misreport-
ing preferences or vacancies do not increase faster than the diminishing probability
of being able to manipulate the mechanism as the market grows larger.









→ 0, as m→∞.
Assumption 3.5.2 simply limits how popular a college can be. This assumption
ensures that even for the college that has the highest probability of being able to
successfully manipulate a stable matching mechanism, the chances from it doing so
converge to zero as the sample size increases. The reason this feature is needed is
because, while in the previous section a small number agents were allowed to mis-
report their preferences as the sample size increased, for a truth telling equilibrium
the low incentives to manipulate the matching mechanism has to apply to all agents.
Theorem 3.5.3 If assumptions 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 are satisfied, then for any ε > 0
there exists an m0 ∈ N such that truth-telling by every college and student is an
ε-Nash equilibrium for any market in the sequence with more than m0 colleges.
So by adding the assumption that agents’ utilities are bounded and by im-
posing restrictions on the maximum popularity from colleges, truth telling becomes
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an ε-equilibrium for sufficiently large markets, i.e., all agents in the economy have
small incentives to misreport their preferences when the market is sufficiently large.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper derives an upper bound for the probability that agents can suc-
cessfully manipulate a stable matching mechanism. It also shows that such upper
bound converges to zero as the market grows larger. In terms of contributions to
the literature, this paper relaxes assumptions that would cause a market to end up
with many unfilled seats after the implementation of the SOSM, so that the results
presented here can be applied to competitive environments in which virtually all
vacancies end up being filled. The speed of convergence for truth-telling is also
significantly faster than the ones obtained in previous studies.
While the analysis in this paper is build under a perfect information environ-
ment, agents are expected to have even less incentives to manipulate a matching
mechanism under imperfect information, given that under such scenario misreport-
ing one’s preferences or vacancies is a risky strategy that can potentially worsen
one’s final allocation. So the actual proportion of agents that would be willing to
manipulate a stable matching mechanism is expected to be much lower in practical
situations than the figures presented in this paper, which only correspond to an
upper bound to those incentives.
Because the results suggest that the SOSM is virtually strategy proof for
large markets, and because it satisfies a series of other desirable properties (it is
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stable, student-optimal, etc.), this mechanism should be considered more often in
practical situations. This is particularly important given that mechanisms like the
Boston school choice mechanism, which not only is unstable but also gives students
strong incentives to misreport their preferences even in large markets, are still widely
popular.
The results from this paper also gives us insight as to which tie breaking rule to
apply in situations where schools exhibit indifferences in their preferences. Indeed,
though papers like Kesten (2012) advocate in favor of using a single tie breaking
lottery in the SOSM in order to increase the correlation of schools’ preferences over
students, and thus reduce schools’ incentives to misreport their true number of seats;
our results suggest that a single tie breaking rule may be unnecessary in large stable
matching markets, given that in such markets schools are very unlikely to be able
to achieve a better outcome by underreporting their capacities, even when schools
have completely uncorrelated rankings over students. Moreover, a single tie breaking
lottery has the disadvantage of making parents from kids who get a low draw from
the lottery to feel as though they have been treated unfairly, which can then lead
them to sue the matchmaker. Such disputes could be avoided if each school held its
own independent lottery.
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Appendix A: Appendices for Chapter 1
A.0.1 Proofs
Proof of proposition 1.3.1: Let C(X) be the set of real bounded continuous
functions with the sup norm defined over [0, η]. If V (q, ·) ∈ C(X), then applying
the following transformation T to V (q, ·):



















we have that T (V (q, ·)) also belongs to C(X). Indeed, because η̃ ∈ [0, η], the
expression λη2 is bounded. In addition, because q ∈ {0, 1}, we have that 0 ≤
µ ≤ 1, so that ω(µ′) = (1 + µ)2/4 is also bounded. And finally, by assumption,
V (q, ·) is bounded, which implies that δV (q, ·) is also bounded. So if we aggregate
all these terms to form the function X(µ, v, η̃) ≡ ω(µ′) − λη̃2 + δV (q, µ′) defined
over [0, 1] × R × [0, η] (where µ′ is obtained by constraint A.2), we have that X is
bounded. Therefore, there exists x, x ∈ R such that x ≤ X(µ, y, η̃) ≤ x for any
(µ, v, η) ∈ [0, 1]× R× [0, η]. This implies that








2σ2 X(µ, v, η̃) dv ∈ [x, x], ∀µ ∈ [0, 1],
so that T (V (q, ·)) is bounded.
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The continuity of T (V (q, µ)) follows from the fact that the function f : [0, 1]×








2σ2 [µ2 − λη̃2 + δV (q, µ′)] dv,
is continuous,1 and the set of feasible choices for η̃, [0, η], is compact so that, from
the maximum theorem,
T (V (q, µ)) = max
η̃∈[0,η]
f(µ, η̃)
is continuous with respect to µ.
Now the operator T : C(X) → C(X) clearly satisfies the Blackwell sufficient
conditions for a β-contraction. Because C(X) is a Banach space, the contraction
1To show that f(µ, η̃) is continuous, define




2σ2 [µ2 − λη̃2 + δV (q, µ′)],
and let (µn, η̃n)
∞
n=1 be a generic sequence defined on [0, 1] × [0, η] such that (µn, η̃n) → (µ, η̃).
Because g(·) is continuous (since it is the multiplication of continuous functions), the sequence of
functions hn : R→ R such that
hn(v) = g(µn, η̃n, v), ∀n ∈ N and ∀v ∈ R,
converges pointwise to h(·) such that
h(v) ≡ g(µ, η̃, v) ∀v ∈ R.
Moreover, because |hn(v)| ≤ l(v) ≡ 1√2πσ2 e
− (v−q−η̃)
2
2σ2 max{x,−x} for all n ∈ N and all v ∈ R,
and because l(·) is integrable, we have from Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence Theorem that
lim
n→∞











h(v) dv = f(µ, η̃, v).
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mapping theorem guarantees that the operator T (·) has a unique fixed point in
C(X).
A.0.2 Jaccard similarity index
To compute the Jaccard similarity index, we first generate all sequences of 4
words from each review. We call those sequences as “shingles”. As an example,
consider the following hypothetical review:
“These wireless earphones are the best!”
The shingles from the above sentence are:
1. “These wireless earphones are”
2. “wireless earphones are the”
3. “earphones are the best”
Now doing the same process with the following sentence:
“Those earphones are the best I ever had!”,
we get the shingles
I “Those earphones are the”
II “earphones are the best”
III “are the best I”
IV “best I ever had”
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The Jaccard similarity between those two reviews is given by the number of
shingles that intersect divided by the added number of shingles from each review.
So in the current example, one can see that shingles 3 and II are the only ones that
match. So the Jaccard similarity between those reviews is given by 2/(3+4) = 0.29.
While computing the Jaccard similarity index is computationally feasible for
a pair of small reviews, doing so for thousands of potentially large reviews is compu-
tationally infeasible.2 Fortunately, computer scientists have devised clever hashing
algorithms that allows one to consistently estimate the actual Jaccard index in a way
that is computationally feasible. For the purposes of this research I used the widely
popular MinHash algorithm. For more details about how the algorithm works, see
Wang et al. (n.d.).
A.0.3 Variables
A.0.3.1 Näıve Bayes estimate of text reliability
As mentioned earlier, text similarity was build by using a Näıve Bayes classifier.
At a high level, the process consists on computing the frequency from each word that
appears among fake and real reviews, and then using those frequencies to estimate
the probability that a certain sequence of words was generated from a legitimate or
a fraudulent review. The process can be employed using content from both review
text and review title.
More precisely, let text = (w1, w2, · · · , wn) represent a generic sequence of
2For one of my samples, I would need to make 4.17+10 of those computations.
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words used to review a product. Then it follows from Bayes’ rule that:




P (real|text) = P (text|real)P (real)
P (text)
,
where the notation is self explanatory.
So conditional on its content, a review is more likely to be fake iff
P (fake|text) > P (real|text)
⇐⇒ P (text|fake)P (fake) > P (text|real)P (real)
⇐⇒ log(P (text|fake)) + log(P (fake)) > log(P (text|real)) + log(P (real)). (A.3)
Getting an unbiased and consistent estimate of P (fake) is relatively easy: one
only needs to compute the fraction of reviews in the sample that are fake (though in
practice one actually uses the fraction of reviews in the sample that are classified as
fake, as it is virtually impossible to perfectly distinguish fake reviews from real ones).
But unless one is willing to make restrictions regarding the data generating process
(DGP) from review texts, one can not hope to obtain an unbiased and consistent
estimates of P (text|fake) and P (text|real).
The Näıve Bayes classifier approach simplifies the DGP from review texts
by assuming that words are generated randomly and independently. Though this
assumption is not very realistic since words need to be put in a logical order in order
to convey meaning, it greatly simplifies the process of finding a reliable estimate of
P (text|fake). Indeed, letting text = (w1, w2, · · · , wn) denote the sequence of words
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Because the probabilities P (wi|fake) can be consistently estimated by computing
the proportion of times each word wi appears on the set of words used to write fake
reviews, one can consistently estimate P (text|fake) by multiplying those estimated
probabilities.3 The same approach can be applied to estimate P (text|real).
So the aforementioned procedure was used to estimate the left and righthand
side of inequality A.3. If the estimated P (real|text) was greater than P (fake|text),
then the dummy variable “Reliability index from review text” would assume value 1,
else it would assume value 0. The same procedure was used to compute “Reliability
index from review tile”, but using the contents from the review title as opposed to
the review text.
A.0.3.2 Detecting anomalous peaks on the volume of 5 star reviews
Detecting spikes on the number of 5 star reviews received by a seller was done
using an STL (seasonal trend decomposition) approach. The process consists on
first estimating the expected number of positive reviews that a seller should receive
at a particular day as a function of trend, seasonal effects and covariates. If the
estimated prediction was sufficiently distant from the realization of positive reviews
on that period, a dummy would classify all the 5 star reviews that the seller received
3As a standard approach, stop words, such as “I”, “there”, “but”, etc., were removed from the
reviews before conducting the Näıve Bayes estimation.
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on that day as anomalous.
More precisely, reviews were aggregated on a daily level to create a panel data.
Let Xi,t,p,s be the number of 5 stars that a product p from seller s received at date t,
during its i’th period since it entered the market (notice that t is the actual date it
received a review, whereas i corresponds to the number of days since that product
got its first review). Xi,s,p,t was regressed against its lagged components, trend,
seasonal dummies, and seller fixed effect, likewise:
Xi,t,p,s = β0Xi−1,t−1,p,s + β1t+
7∑
j=1
γjDj,t + αs + εi,t,p,s,
where {Dj,t}7j=1 are the dummies for the corresponding days of week, αs is the seller’s
fixed effect, and εi,t,p,s is an iid random term.
After estimating the model using OLS, it was determined that if a residual
term was 4 standard deviations above or below the average residual, then that day
for the corresponding seller would be flagged as anomalous, in which case all the 5
star reviews that the seller received on that day would be flagged as anomalous.
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Appendix B: Appendices for Chapter 3
B.1 Dropping strategies are exhaustive
A college is said to adopt a dropping strategy if it reports a subset of students
as unacceptable while truthfully reporting its order of preferences over the remaining
students. Formally, dropping strategies are defined as follows:
Definition B.1.1 For a given market (S,C,S, RC , q), a preference and vacancy
report (R′c, q
′
c) from college c is said to be a dropping strategy if
1. ∅Rcs implies that ∅R′cs for all s ∈ S.
2. There is a set D ⊆ S such that sRc∅ and ∅R′cs for all s ∈ D, and sRcs′ if and
only if sR′cs
′ for all s ∈ S\D.
3. q′c = qc.
As stated in the main text, Storms (2013) has shown that we can focus on
this specific type of manipulation to analyze colleges’ incentives to game the SOSM
mechanism. The proof is replicated below.
Lemma B.1.1 (Dropping strategies are exhaustive) Consider a market (S,C,S
,C , q) and a stable matching mechanism for ψ for that market. Then, for any
121
pair of preference and vacancy report (R̃c, q̃c) from college c, there exists a dropping
strategy (R′c, qc) such that
ψ(S, (R̃c, R−c), (q̃c, q−c)) c ψ(S, (R′c, R−c), q).
Proof: Consider the preference and vacancy report (R̃c, q̃c) from college c, and
define
µ ≡ ψ(S, (R̃c, R−c), (q̃c, q−c)).
Let (R′c, qc) be the dropping strategy that defines all students in the set
D ≡ {s ∈ S; s /∈ µ(c) or ∅Rcs} as unacceptable, but preserves the same prefer-
ence ordering as Rc for those students not in D. Then clearly,
ψ(S, (R′c, R−c), q)(c) ⊆ {s ∈ µ(c); sR′c∅}.
We want to show that
ψ(S, (R′c, R−c), q)(c) = {s ∈ µ(c); sR′c∅},
because, since the set {s ∈ µ(c); sR′c∅} equals to µ(c) excluding all those students
in µ(c) that college c finds unacceptable according to Rc, we must have that
{s ∈ µ(c); sR′c∅} c µ(c).





µ(c′), if c′ 6= c,
{s ∈ µ(c); sR′c∅}, if c′ = c.
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For college c we have that
sR′c∅ for all s ∈ µ1(c). (B.1)
For all other colleges c′ 6= c, we have µ1(c′) = µ(c), which, since µ is stable and thus
individually rational in market (S,C,S, (R̃c, R−c), q̃c, q−c), implies that
µ1(c
′) c′ ∅, ∀c′ 6= c. (B.2)
For every student s ∈ S, either µ1(s) = µ(s) or µ1(s) = ∅. In either case,
because µ is individually rational in market (S,C,S, (R̃c, R−c), q̃c, q−c), we must
have
µ1(s) s ∅. (B.3)
Together, conditions (B.1) to (B.3) imply that µ1 is individually rational in
market (S,C,S, (R′c, R−c), q).
Now clearly, because {s ∈ µ(c); sR′c∅} is the set of all acceptable students from
college c according to the preference list R′c, and because µ1(c) = {s ∈ µ(c); sR′c∅}
we have that college c can not be part of college-student pair that blocks µ1 in
market (S,C,S, (R′c, R−c), q). Adding this to the fact that µ1(c) ⊆ µ(c) and
µ1(c
′) = µ(c′) ∀c′ 6= c and the fact that µ is a stable allocation in market (S,C,S
, (R̃c, R−c), q̃c, q−c), we have that the only student-college pairs that may potentially
block µ1 in market (S,C,S, (R′c, R−c), q), are the ones involving a students s such
that µ(s) = c and µ1(s) = ∅ and a college c′ 6= c.
So lets iteratively generate a stable matching allocation by adopting the fol-
lowing algorithm:
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Step 1) Select an arbitrary student s′ that can be paired with some college to block µ1
in market (S,C,S, (R′c, R−c), q). Let college c′ be student s′ most preferred
college among all the colleges it can use to form such a blocking pair. Define





′) ∪ s′ if |µ1(c′)| < qc,
µ1(c
′) ∪ s′\{s̃; s′′Rcs̃ ∀ s′′ ∈ µ0(c) s.t. s′′ 6= s̃}, else.
Clearly, in market (S,C,S, (R′c, R−c), q), µ2 is individually rational, and only
students unmatched under µ2 can potentially form a pair with some college
to block µ2. If there is no such student, define µ̃ = µ2 and end the algorithm,
else, proceed to step 2.
Step k) Select an arbitrary student s′ that can be paired with some college to block µk
in market (S,C,S, (R′c, R−c), q). Let college c′ be student s′ most preferred
college among all the colleges it can use to form such a blocking pair. Define





′) ∪ s′ if |µk(c′)| < qc,
µk(c
′) ∪ s′\{s̃; s′′Rcs̃ ∀ s′′ ∈ µ0(c) s.t. s′′ 6= s̃}, else.
Clearly, in market (S,C,S, (R′c, R−c), q), µk+1 is individually rational, and
only students unmatched under µk+1 can potentially form a pair with some
college to block µk+1. If there is no such student, define µ̃ = µk+1 and end the
algorithm, else, proceed to step k + 1.
Because at each step of the algorithm, colleges forming the blocking pair are
always made strictly better off as compared to the previous match, while all other
124
colleges get the same match as the previous one, we have that the algorithm must
eventually stop after a finite number of steps, since each college can only improve a
finite number of times in a market with a finite number of students.
By construction, µ̃ is stable in market (S,C,S, (R′c, R−c), q), and since we
have that at every step of the algorithm college c can never be part of a blocking
pair, we also have that µ̃(c) = µ1(c) = {s ∈ µ(c); sR′c∅}.
Because the number of vacancies filled by each college is always the same in
any stable match (Roth and Stomayor (1992)), this implies that
|µ̃(c)| = |ψ(S, (R′c, R−c), q)(c)|. (B.4)
Since ψ(S, (R′c, R−c), q)(c) ⊆ {s ∈ µ(c); sR′c∅} = µ̃(c), (B.4) implies that
ψ(S, (R′c, R−c), q)(c) = {s ∈ µ(c); sR′c∅},
as we wanted to show.
B.2 Rejection Chains
Let µS denote the student optimal stable match in market (S,C,S, RC , q). In
order to simplify notation, we assume every student is acceptable to every college in
this market. Then we define a rejection chain for the subset of students B0c ⊆ µS(c)
matched with college c as follows:
Algorithm 4 (Rejection Chains)
1. Initialize the algorithm with i = 0, Hc′ = µS(c
′) ∀c′ ∈ C, and define As′ as the
set of acceptable colleges student s′ ∈ S did not propose to under the SOSM.
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2. If Bic = ∅, terminate the algorithm. Else, let s ∈ Bic be such that s′Rcs ∀s′ ∈
Bic\{s} (i.e., let s be college c’s least preferred student among Bic). Then, set
Bi+1c = B
i
c\{s} and proceed to step 3.
3. (a) If As = ∅, set i = i+ 1 and go back to phase 2, else:
(b) Let c′ be student s most preferred college among As. Then student s
applies to that college and we set As = As\{c′} and Hc′ = Hc′ ∪ {s} . If
c′ = c, terminate the algorithm, else:
(c) If sRc′s
′ for some s′ ∈ Hc′ and |Hc′| ≥ qc′, set s = s′, and restart step 3.
Else:
(d) If sRc′s
′ for some s′ ∈ Hc′ and |Hc′ | < qc′, set i = i + 1 and return to
step 2. Else:
(e) If s′Rc′s ∀s′ ∈ Hc′, go back to the beginning of step 3.
Lemma B.2.1 In market (S,C,S, RC , q), let Xc′(R′c) be the number of students
who make a proposal to college c′ in the student optimal deferred acceptance algo-
rithm, when college c adopts the dropping strategy (R′c, qc) and all other agents report
their preferences and vacancies truthfully. Then, if the set of students reported as
unacceptable under the dropping strategy (R′c, qc) is contained in the set of students




In words, lemma B.2.1 simply states that, the more students a college drops from
its preference list, the more offers the college potentially gets under the SOSM
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mechanism. The intuition for the proof is that, the higher the number of students
that a college c lists as unacceptable, the more likely the college is to reject students,
who on their turn will potentially make offers to other colleges, triggering a rejection
chain that may potentially generate a new offer to college c. For a detailed proof,
see Storms (2013).
Lemma B.2.2 In market (S,C,S, RC , q), a college c has incentives to manipulate
the SOSM mechanism ψS only if algorithm 4 with B
0
c = µS(c) ends with college c
receiving an offer (i.e., at the end of step 3b).
Proof: Consider an arbitrary dropping strategy (R′c, qc) from college c. Suppose
by contrapositive that algorithm 4 with B0c = µS(c) does not end with a new offer
being made to college c (i.e., it ends at step 2). Then, we want to show that
µS(c) c ψS(S, (R′c, R−c), q)(c). (B.5)




i.e., a college won’t have incentives to manipulate the SOSM mechanism if the set
of offers college c gets under any dropping strategy is always contained in the set of
offers college c gets when it reports its preferences and number of vacancies truthfully
in the student optimal deferred acceptance algorithm.
Let (R̃c, qc) be the dropping strategy from college c that selects all students
in Xc(Rc) as unacceptable, while keeping college c’s original preference list for the
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remaining students. Then, because algorithm 4 with B0c = µS(c) does not end with
a new offer being made to college c, we clearly have that Xc(R̃c) = Xc(Rc).
1
Now let (R∗c , qc) be the dropping strategy that selects all students in the match-
ing mechanism as unacceptable. Because students in S\Xc(R̃c) never propose to col-
lege c after performing the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm under
preferences and vacancies (S, (R̃c, R−c), q), we have that if, in addition to rejecting
students in Xc(R̃c), college c also selects students in S\Xc(R̃c) as unacceptable, then
that should not affect the set of students that propose to college c, which implies
that Xc(R̃c) = Xc(R
∗
c).




c) ⊆ Xc(R∗c) = Xc(R̃c) = Xc(Rc),
as we wanted to show.
Lemma B.2.3 For a given market (S,C,S, RC , q), consider a stable matching
mechanism ψ and a strategy report (R̃c, q̃c) from college c. Then, letting ψS denote
the SOSM mechanism, we have that there exists a dropping strategy (R′c, qc) from
1This is due to the fact that, at the beginning of algorithm 4, all students in Xc(Rc) but not
in µS(c) have already been rejected by college c in the student-proposing deferred acceptance
algorithm, and then, at the end of algorithm 4, all students in µS(c) are rejected by college c.
Therefore, because at the end of algorithm 4, college c has rejected all students in Xc(Rc), and
because no new offer is made to college c, and because the order of offers and rejections in the
Gale and Shapley algorithm is irrelevant, we have that, if college c adopts the dropping strategy
(R̃c, qc) which selects all students in Xc(Rc) as unacceptable and preserves the preference list for
all other students, it won’t receive any new offer, so that Xc(R̃c) = Xc(Rc).
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college c such that:
ψ(S, (R̃c, R−c), (q̃c, q−c))(c) = ψS(S, (R′c, R−c), q)(c).
Proof: Consider the strategy (R′c, qc) from college c that selects all students not
in ψ(S, (R̃c, R−c), (qc, q−c))(c) as unacceptable, while keeping the same preference
ordering over the remaining students as in R̃c. Then,
ψS(S, (R′c, R−c), q)(c) ⊆ ψ(S, (R̃c, R−c), (q̃c, q−c))(c). (B.6)
Clearly, because the matching ψS(S, (R′c, R−c), q) is stable in market (S,C,S
, (R′c, R−c), q), we have that the matching µ such that
µ(c′) =

ψS(S, (R′c, R−c), q)(c′), if c′ 6= c
ψ(S, (R̃c, R−c), (q̃c, q−c))(c), if c′ = c
is also stable in this same market.2
Because the number of vacancies filled by a college is always the same in every
stable match, we have that
|ψS(S, (R′c, R−c), q)(c)| = |µ(c)|,
which, by (B.6), implies that
ψS(S, (R′c, R−c), q)(c) = ψ(S, (R̃c, R−c), (q̃c, q−c))(c),
as we wanted to show.
2To see this, notice that the matching µ equals to the matching ψS(S , (R′c, R−c), q), with the
only potential difference being that college c may be better off by being matched to additional
acceptable students (according to preferences R′c) who, on their turn, prefer to be matched to
college c over staying unmatched, as in ψS(S , (R′c, R−c), q).
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Lemma B.2.4 If a college does not have incentives to manipulate the SOSM mech-
anism, then it does not have incentives to manipulate any stable matching mecha-
nism.
Proof: Let ψ be an arbitrary stable matching mechanism defined in market (S,C,S
,C , q), and let (R̃c, q̃c) be an arbitrary preference and vacancy report from college
c. Then, if ψS is the SOSM mechanism, we have, from lemma B.2.3 that there exists
a dropping strategy (R′c, qc) such that
ψS(S, (R′c, R−c), q)(c) = ψ(S, (R̃c, R−c), (q̃c, q−c))(c).
Assuming college c can not manipulate the SOSM mechanism implies that
ψS(S, RC , q)(c) c ψS(S, (R′c, R−c), q)(c) = ψ(S, (R̃c, R−c), (q̃c, q−c))(c). (B.7)
But because the SOSM is the worst stable match for colleges (Roth and Stom-
ayor (1992)), we must have
ψ(S, RC , q)(c) c ψS(S, RC , q)(c). (B.8)
Together, (B.7) and (B.8) imply that
ψ(S, RC , q)(c) c ψ(S, (R̃c, R−c), (q̃c, q−c))(c).
Because the choice of (R̃c, q̃c) was arbitrary, we have that college c can not manip-
ulate the matching mechanism ψ.
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B.3 Stochastic student-proposing DA algorithm and stochastic re-
jection chains
Consider a stochastic market (S,C, PS, PC , q). It can be easily shown that
the data generating process (DGP) for the preference list from colleges described
in section 3.4, in which all students have the same popularity, is equivalent to the
following DGP (in the sense that it generates the same distribution of preference
lists):
step 1) For a given college c, and a given differentiable cumulative density function
F (·) select an arbitrary student s1c ∈ S and draw a random number x1c from dis-
tribution F . That number will represent college c’s utility over being matched
with student s1c . Defining H
1
c = {s1c}, we clearly have that, since H1c has a
unique element, student s1c must be college c’s favorite student from H
1
c .
step 2) Next, select some arbitrary student s2c ∈ S\H1c and draw a random number
x2c from the same distribution F , which will represent college c’s utility over




c ∪ s2c we have that s2c will






step k) Select some arbitrary student skc ∈ S\Hk−1c and draw a random number xkc
from the same distribution F , which will represent college c’s utility over being




c ∪ skc we have that skc will be
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college c′s lth preferred student among Hkc if it provides the lth highest utility
to college c among Hkc .
Continue this process until college c has formed a preference list over all of the
students in the market.
It can be shown that the order in which students are added to the preference
list does not affect the overall distribution of preferences. Defining the DGP in
this manner is useful because it allows us to easily compute the probability that a
college accepts a new offer at some step of the student-proposing deferred acceptance
algorithm, or at some step of algorithm 4, conditional on the set of offers that the
college has received so far.
With that in mind, we have that the following algorithm is stochastically
equivalent to drawing entire preference lists for students and colleges according to
the data generating process described in section 3.4, and then implementing the
student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm on the realized preferences.
Algorithm 5 (Stochastic student-proposing DA algorithm)
1. Initialization: Let l = 1. For every s ∈ S, let As = ∅, Hc = ∅. Throughout
the algorithm we will denote R̃c as the preference list from college c among the
students in Hc.
2. Choosing the applicant:
a) If l ≤ |S|, then let s be the lth student (student sl) and increment l by
one.
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b) Else, terminate the algorithm.
3. Choosing the applied:
a) If |As| ≥ k, return to step 2.
b) Else, select c randomly from distribution PC until c /∈ As, and then define
As = As ∪ {c}.
4. Acceptance or rejection: Draw an utility from a fixed distribution F (·), to
represent the college c’s utility from being matched with student s. If the utility
is lower than the utility from college c’s qc most preferred students among the
ones that have applied to that college so far, the student is rejected, and we
return to step 3. Else, the student becomes tentatively matched with college
c; and if the college was already tentatively matched with qc students (i.e.,
operating in full capacity), the college rejects its least preferred student among
the students that it was tentatively matched with, and we redefine s as the
rejected student and we go back to step 3, else we go back to step 2.
This process goes on until each student is either tentatively matched with a college,
or has applied to k colleges.
The resulting match obtained after performing this algorithm, µS, is such that
µS(c) equals to the most preferred students from college c among the ones that have
applied to that college throughout the algorithm, up to college c’s capacity, qc.
Algorithm 6 (Stochastic rejection chain)
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Let µS be the match obtained after performing the stochastic student-proposing
DA algorithm. Define As as the set of colleges that student s has applied to through-
out the student-proposing DA algorithm, and let Hc̃ be the set of students who applied
to college c̃ throughout the same algorithm. We start the stochastic rejection chain
with each college c̃ tentatively matched with µS(c̃) (i.e., each college c̃ starts tenta-
tively matched with its qc̃ most preferred students among Hc̃).
We define a rejection chain for the subset of students B0c ⊆ µS(c) matched
with college c as follows:
1. Initialize the algorithm with i = 0.
2. If Bic = ∅, terminate the algorithm. Else, let s be college c’s least preferred




c\{s} and proceed to step 3.
3. [a)]
If |As| ≥ k, set i = i+ 1 and go back to step 2, else:
(a)b Select c̃ ∈ C randomly from distribution PC until c̃ /∈ As. Then student
s applies to college c̃ and we set As = As ∪ {c̃}. If c̃ = c, terminate the
algorithm, else:
(c) Redefine Hc̃ = Hc̃ ∪ c̃. Draw an utility from a fixed distribution F (·),
to represent the college c̃’s utility from being matched with student s.
If the utility is lower than the utility from college c̃’s qc most preferred
students among Hc̃, the student is rejected, and we return to step 3. Else,
the student becomes tentatively matched with college c̃; and if the college
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was already tentatively matched with qc̃ students (i.e., operating in full
capacity), the college rejects its least preferred student among the students
that it was tentatively matched with, and we redefine s as the rejected
student and we go back to step 3, else we go back to step 2.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.1: Assume all colleges cj with j ≤ k − 1 (i.e., the
k− 1 most popular colleges) can manipulate a stable match with probability 1. For
the remaining colleges cj such that j > k − 1, we will find an upper bound to the
probability that algorithm 6 with B0cj = µS(cj) ends with a new offer being made to
college cj.
Clearly, if at some point of the algorithm a student makes an offer to a college
with open vacancies, the chain of new offers immediately stops, and as a result college
cj does not receive a new offer. So we can get an upper bound to the probability
that a new offer is made to the college triggering the rejection chain by assuming
that, throughout all the steps of algorithm 6, a student making an offer always does
so to a college with no open vacancies. This conservative assumption simplifies the
computation of our upper bound, and will thus be used throughout the rest of the
analysis.
The more likely a college with all vacancies filled accepts a new student in
algorithm 6, the more likely the chain of new offers will continue to generate a new
offer to college cj.
3 And the less the number of applications a college has received
3This intuitive fact can be verified analytically by replacing 1− 1qj+1 into expression (B.10) by
a generic probability, and then conducting comparative statics analysis on Ucj through the usage
of the implicit function theorem, to show that Ucj is increasing in this probability.
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so far, the more likely it will accept a new one, which is why we assume, throughout
the algorithm, that whenever a college is faced with a new offer, it has received a
number of offers exactly equal to its capacity: no more and no less. No more because
that would increase the probability that a new offer is rejected, and no less because
that would cause the algorithm to stop immediately and without a new offer ever
being made to the college triggering the rejection chain.
With these assumptions, let Xi,c denote the random utility drawn from the
cdf F (·), which represents the utility that college c gets from being matched with
student i. Let Yc denote the lowest utility that college c gets from the students it
is already tentatively matched with. Then, a college will accept a new offer if and
only if Xi,c > Yc. Because Xi,c has cdf F (·), the expected probability that college c
accepts the new offer from student i is given by
EYc,Xi,c [Prob(Xi,c ≥ Yc)] = EYc [1− F (Yc)] . (B.9)
To simplify notation, assume college c is currently matched with students
{s1, s2, · · · , sqj} (and recall that we are assuming that these are the only students
who have made an offer to that college so far). Then, the cdf of Yc is given by
G(y) = Prob(min{X1, · · · , Xqj} ≤ y)
= 1− Prob(X1 ≥ y, · · · , Xqj ≥ y)
= 1− (1− F (y))qj ,
which implies its pdf is given by
g(y) = qj(1− F (y))qj−1f(y).
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Therefore, from expression B.9, the expected probability that a college accepts
a new offer at each step of algorithm 6 is given by

























A student making a new offer does so to college cj with highest probability
when the student has already offered to the top k− 1 colleges, excluding college cj.
Therefore, an upper bound to the probability the new offer is made to college cj,






Clearly the more likely students offer to college cj at each step of algorithm 6,
the more likely the rejection chain will result in a new offer being made to college
cj.
4 Therefore, we will assume that, throughout the rejection chains, each student






Therefore, we can get an upper bound Ucj to the probability that a college cj
with j ≥ k gets a new offer after rejecting one acceptable student, by solving the





into expression (B.10) by a
generic probability, and then conducting comparative statics analysis on Ucj , by using the implicit








































































corresponds to the probability that a matched college accepts a new
offer, and 1
qj+1
is the probability that the college rejects a new offer. If at some
point of the rejection chain a college rejects a proposal from a student, that student
can still apply to its remaining acceptable colleges. Because each student has only
k acceptable choices, and because each student making an offer at some step of
the algorithm has already been rejected by at least one college, each student in the
rejection chain can not make more than k − 1 offers, which is why this summation






is the probability that the current offer is
made to college cj. Whenever a new offer is not made to college cj, which happens






, the rejection chain goes on, which is why we multiply






by the upper bound Uc.




















































Because college cj can reject at most qj students, we have that, for any j ≥ k,
an upper bound to the probability college cj can manipulate a stable match is given
by qjUcj . Because qj ≤ q and because this upper bound is linearly increasing in qj,
we have that an upper bound to the probability that college qj obtains a new offer

























Adding all these upper bounds, including the upper bound of 1 for the k − 1
most popular colleges, and then dividing the sum by m, we get the following upper































Now recall that, by assumption, pcj ≥ pcj+1 ∀j < m. Suppose that that
pcj > pcj+1 for a certain j ≥ k. What would happen to the upper bound we just
computed if we transferred some popularity from college cj to college cj+1? More
precisely, what would happen to the upper bound U(m) from equation (B.11) if the
popularity from college cj was changed to pcj−ε and the popularity from college cj+1
was changed to pcj+1+ε, such that pcj−ε > pcj+1+ε, keeping the popularities from all
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, and B ≡ q× m−k+1
m
,
we have that the variation in the upper bound would be given by
∆U(m)(ε) ≡ B




































which is greater than zero if and only if
1− (1− A)
(





> 1− (1− A)
(





⇐⇒ pcj − ε > pcj+1 + ε,
which is satisfied by assumption.
Therefore, the upper bound U(m) from equation (B.11) increases the more
popularity is transferred from college cj to college cj+1, so that the upper bound is
highest when pcj = pcj+1 . Because this is true for any j such that k ≤ j < m, we








m− k + 1 ∀j ≥ k.
So the following expression provides a tighter upper bound to the probability that


























From lemma B.2.4, a necessary condition for a college not to have incentives to ma-
nipulate a stable matching mechanism is that it has no incentives to manipulate the
SOSM, which implies that U(m) is also an upper bound to the expected proportion
of colleges that can manipulate any stable matching mechanism.
The rest of the proof, namely, that this expression converges to zero, is trivial.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.2: From lemma B.2.3 and from the fact that the
student optimal stable match is college pessimal, a necessary (but not sufficient)
condition for a college not to have incentives to manipulate any stable matching
mechanism is that it must be matched with the same set of students in every stable
match. Therefore, form theorem 3.4.1, the expected number of colleges that are
matched with different students at different stable matches is less than or equal to
α(m). Because each college has at most q vacancies, the maximum expected propor-






Because a sufficient (and necessary) condition for a student not to have incentives
to manipulate any stable matching mechanism is that it gets the same allocation in
every stable match, we have that the proportion of students who can manipulate a





. If |Sm| ≥ m












→ 0, as m→∞,
which implies that β(m)|Sm| → 0, as m→∞.
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B.4 Simulated Incentives to misreport preferences or vacancies under
different DGP
On section 3.4 we make the assumption that all students have the same pop-
ularity, i.e., students are equally likely from being considered as top choices from
schools. Though this might seem like a very restrictive assumption, we show through
simulations that, for cases in which schools’ preferences are more correlated they on
average have less incentives to fake reviews.
Using the DGP suggested by Ashlagi, Kanoria and Leshno (2015), assume
that each agent i has two characteristics, xAi and x
D
i . The utility of agent i being
matched with agent j is given by:
ui(j) = βx
A
j − γ(xDi − xDj )2 + εi,j,
where xAj , x
B
j and εi,j are uniformly and independently distributed between [0, 1].
γ and β are parameters that capture the level of correlation between agents’ pref-
erences, with γ = β = 0 being the case in which agents’ preferences are completely
uncorrelated, which corresponds to the case in which every agent has the same
popularity.
Figure B.1 plots the simulated proportion of cases in which a college can po-
tentially have incentives to misreport its vacancies or capacity in a stable matching
mechanism, as a function of parameters β and γ. More precisely, it plots the propor-
tion of colleges that obtain at least one new offer after rejecting all of the students
















Figure B.1: Simulated proportion of colleges that had potential incentives to misre-
port preferences or vacancies under the SOSM mechanism, for different combinations
of γ and β. The simulations were done assuming there were 45 colleges each offering
5 vacancies, and 225 students, so that the number of students equals to the overall
number of vacancies. Each student was assumed to have k = 5 acceptable choices.
seen from the plot, incentives to misreport one’s preferences are highest in the case
in which preferences are perfectly uncorrelated, i.e., when β = γ = 0.
It is important to emphasize that theorem 3.4.1 requires students’ popularities
to be uniform only for tractability purposes. Indeed, the theorem uses the most
conservative scenarios to compute the probability that a generic college can receive
a new offer after rejecting a student. The more popular a student is, the more likely
a college will receive a new offer after rejecting that student. So if we assume that
a generic college finds itself in the most conservative scenario, namely, that it is
143
matched with the most popular students, then a rejection will generate a new offer
for that college with high probability, thus inflating the upper bound. However, in
reality there can only be so many very popular students, i.e., it is impossible for two
or more different colleges to be each simultaneously matched with the top q most
popular students, as each student can only be matched with a single college at a
time. But because it is virtually impossible to take expectations as to who ends up
matched with whom in the SOSM (even for relatively small markets, the number
of possible different matches can greatly exceed the estimated number of atoms in
the universe), the best we can do is make the conservative assumption that every
college finds itself matched with the top q most popular students, even though in
reality that is not possible. But this (unrealistic) assumption then inflates the upper
bound, compromising its convergence. So the assumption that every student has
the same popularity is used to avoid such technicality.
B.5 Equilibrium Analysis
Lemma B.5.1 If assumption 3.5.2 is satisfied, then the probability that any college
can manipulate a stable matching mechanism goes to zero, as m→∞.
Proof: An upper bound to the probability that a student who has been re-
jected at some step of the stochastic rejection chain makes a new offer to the college








Therefore, by a similar argument as the one used to prove theorem 3.4.1, an upper
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bound Um to the probability that any generic college gets a new offer after rejecting









































































































































Because each college can reject at most q students after the execution of the
SOSM mechanism, the upper bound to the probability that a college can manipulate









as m→∞, which implies that qUm → 0 as m→∞.
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Lemma B.5.2 If assumption 3.5.2 is satisfied, then the probability that any student
can manipulate a stable matching mechanism goes to zero, as m→∞.
Proof: Notice that the upper bound computed in the proof of theorem B.5.1 to
the probability that a college can manipulate a stable matching mechanism did not
depend on the particular preferences of the students it rejected after performing the
SOSM. Therefore, conditional on having a certain preference, the probability that a
student is matched to the same college in every stable match goes to one, as m goes
to infinity. Because being matched to the same college is a necessary and sufficient
condition for a student not to have incentives to misreport its preferences, we have
that the probability that each student can manipulate a SOSM goes to zero as m
goes to infinity.
Proof of Theorem 3.5.3: From Lemmas B.5.1 and B.5.2, the probability
that students and colleges can successfully manipulate a stable matching mechanism
converge to zero as the number of participants in the market goes to infinity. Because
agents’ utilities are assumed to be bounded (assumption 3.5.1), this implies that for
a sufficiently large sample the market has an ε equilibrium in which all agents report
their preferences and vacancies truthfully.
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